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Judicial Review of Constitutional
Transitions: War and Peace and
Other Sundry Matters
Rivka Weill*

ABSTRACT

Constitutional transition periods present a twilight time
between two executives. At such times, the outgoing executive's
authority is questionable because of the democratic difficulties
and agency concerns that arise at the end of the executive's term.
developed
constitutional
Thus, parliamentary systems
conventions that restrict caretaker governments' action. These
conventions seem to achieve the desired results in the United
Kingdom, Canada,New Zealand, and Australia. In contrast, in
the United States, the prevailing norm is that there is only one
president at a time, and this is the incumbent president, who is
fully authorized to govern the country and his or her discretion
is unfettered. Transition periods are thus exploited by U.S.
lame-duck presidents to make last-minute appointments,

* Associate Professor, Radzyner School of Law, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC),
Herzliya. J.S.D., LL.M. Yale Law School. An early partial version of this Article was
presented at an International Conference on Israeli Constitutional Law in
Comparative Perspective in Spring 2011 organized by Bar-Ilan University, Tel-Aviv
University, and the IDC. I thank Bruce Ackerman, Jack M. Beermann, Margit Cohn,
David Fontana, Sanford Levinson, Roz Myers, and Adam Tomkins for their helpful
comments on previous drafts of this Article. This Article is one of a series of articles I
have written on caretaker and lame-duck governments. The first, Twilight Time: On
the Authority of CaretakerGovernment, 13 LAW & GOV'T 167 (2010), written in Hebrew,
addressed solely Israeli caretaker governments. The second, Constitutional
Transitions: The Role of Lame Ducks and Caretakers, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1087, dealt
with caretaker and lame-duck administrations in both parliamentary and presidential
systems through conventions alone, not enforceable in courts, and developed the
appropriate guidelines for such constitutional conventions. This Article builds on both
previous works to suggest when and how courts should intervene and enforce
limitations on constitutional transitions. Furthermore, Twilight Time assumed in brief
that the U.S. nonintervention policy in lame-duck administrations was justified
because of the nature of the presidential system. In contrast, this Article suggests that
Israel's attitude of intervention is superior to the U.S. solution and should even be
considered in the United States. This Article thus expands the work done in Twilight
Time with regard to Israeli caretaker governments operating in a parliamentary
system so that its lessons may become applicable with regard to transitional
governments in general operating in both presidential and parliamentary systems
alike. It should be noted that Hebrew citations and sources were translated by the
author, unless noted otherwise.
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regulations, and even internationalagreements. Israel does not
fit either of the two poles in the dichotomy between
parliamentary systems that successfully deal with caretaker
authority and presidential systems that do not. Though a
parliamentary system, its constitutional history is full of
examples of abuse of caretaker power. This has led Israel's
Supreme Court to treat the sphere of authority of caretaker
governments as justiciablein contrast to other courts' treatment
of the subject. Exploring its case law in issues of war, peace, and
other lesser matters offers a rich case study of the standards
that should govern this unexplored legal-politicalarea.
Using Israel as a case study within a comparative
constitutional framework, this Article suggests three important
lessons. First, it is not the nature of the constitutional system
per se, whether parliamentaryor presidential, that determines
the success of preventing abuses of transitional governments'
power. Rather, the potential for abuse exists in both types of
systems. Furthermore,the challenges posed by these transitional
governments are similar in both types of systems. Second,
transitionalgovernments' power is not a topic that courts are
inherently unable to regulate. Rather, if constitutional
conventions fail to do their job or do not evolve, judicial review
is a potent possibility. Last, it is not enough to determine that
transitionalgovernments must act with restraint, as the Israeli
Supreme Court has determined, but it is important to give
concrete meaning to which actions are permitted by transitional
governments and the circumstances under which they are
allowed. The Article concludes by delineating such general
guidelines.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As a cautionary tale of the vulnerability inherent in transition
periods and the serious dangers that can follow, one need only recall
that the Nazis were able to overtake Prussia-the largest Ldnder
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of Germany's territory and
(state), controlling two-thirds
population-while a caretaker government ran it because, inter alia,
the government was too weak to fight change. At the same time,
Nazism's rise was also enabled by the gradual weakening of the
federal Weimar parliament through repeated dismissals by the
federal executive, which resulted in numerous periods of caretaker
authority seriatum. 1 A nation needs its caretaker to be strong enough
to fight undemocratic revolutionary forces, yet not so strong that it
becomes the vehicle of internal gambits to extend or expand control.
Caretaker and lame-duck governments operate in the interim
between two executives in parliamentary and presidential systems
respectively. 2 They are a recurrent phenomenon around the world,
yet their authority is an academically neglected topic, especially in
the area of constitutional law.3 Despite their name, which implies

1.
DAVID DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: CARL SCHMITT, HANS
KELSEN AND HERMANN HELLER IN WEIMAR 1-37 (1997) (discussing the rise and fall of

the Weimar Republic and calling it a "failed experiment in democracy"); Jeffrey Seitzer
& Christopher Thornhill, An Introduction to Carl Schmitt's Constitutional Theory:
Issues and Context, in CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 22-23 (Jeffrey Seitzer
ed. & trans., 2008) (discussing Nazi takeover of Prussian caretaker government). See
generally David Dyzenhaus, Legal Theory in the Collapse of the Weimar: Contemporary
Lessons?, 91 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 121 (1997) (discussing the collapse of the Weimar
Republic). The term "caretaker government" became prevalent after World War II. J.C.
JOHARI, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA: A POLITICO-LEGAL STUDY 139-40 (2007). The
term spread after Winston Churchill formed a caretaker government to govern Britain
in the interregnum after he resigned from the wartime national coalition of the Labour
and Conservative political parties and until a new government was formed following
elections. Id. This government was "quite exceptional" in Britain in the sense that
Churchill composed a new interim government rather than continuing with the old
government until a new government was formed after elections. See SIR IVOR
JENNINGS, CABINET GOVERNMENT 86 n.1 (3d ed. 1959) ("[Ilt is not British practice to
appoint a 'Caretaker Government' for the duration of a general election."). Churchill
acted in this way because his coalition broke apart. Id.
2.
A caretaker government is a government functioning in a parliamentary
system in the interregnum following elections and before the formation of a new
government, or a government whose term has ended prematurely. See Rivka Weill,
ConstitutionalTransitions:The Role of Lameducks and Caretakers,2011 UTAH L. REV.
1087, 1089 (2011) (defining a caretaker government). In contrast, lame-duck president
status is mostly relevant after elections, when it is clear that the incumbent is not
continuing for another term. Id. It should be noted that there are no official or
consensual definitions for these transitional governments. See John Copeland Nagle,
The Lame Ducks of Marbury, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 317, 338-39 (2003) (discussing
different possible definitions of lame-duck periods). In fact, some studies treat the
transition period as stretching over many months prior to elections. See, e.g., DENIS S.
RUTKUS & KEVIN M. SCOTT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34615, NOMINATION AND
CONFIRMATION OF LOWER FEDERAL COURT JUDGES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION YEARS 9
n.27, 10, 22-24 (2008), available at http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/
bitstreams/19070.pdf (exploring the reasons behind the dramatic slowdown in
presidential appointments to the judiciary that are confirmed by the Senate during the
last few months of a presidential term).
See Jonathan Boston et al., Caretaker Government and the Evolution of
3.
CaretakerConventions in New Zealand, 28 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 629, 630
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that their power is or should be curtailed, these governments enjoy
full authority in most democratic legal regimes. The justification is
practical: Someone needs to run the state even during transition
periods. Yet, these governments suffer from both agency difficulties
and democratic deficits.
To deal with the challenges, parliamentary systems have
developed conventions, not enforceable in courts, for restraining
caretaker actions. 4 In fact, these conventions seem to work well in the
United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. These
countries barely discuss caretaker power, and they do not report
significant abuse of that power. This is so despite the fact that some
of these countries have proportional-representation election methods
and thus suffer from long transition periods. 5 No similar conventions

(1998) ("The international academic literature on caretaker government is
exceptionally thin."); Michael Laver & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Cabinet Government in
TheoreticalPerspective, in CABINET MINISTERS AND PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT 292
(Michael Laver & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1994) ("It is important ... to be aware of
the policy implications of having a caretaker cabinet in power. Surprisingly, this is a
matter that has been more or less totally ignored by the literature on government
formation ....).
4.
See GEOFFREY PALMER & MATTHEW PALMER, BRIDLED POWER: NEW
ZEALAND'S CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT 45-47 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing the
"Main Principles" of the caretaker convention); Boston et al., supra note 3 (examining
New Zealand's caretaker conventions); Laver & Shepsle, supra note 3, at 292-94
(discussing possible legislative control of the caretaker cabinet). See generally Glyn
Davis et al., Rethinking CaretakerConventions for Australian Governments, 60 AUST. J.
PUB. ADMIN. 11 (2001) (discussing how caretaker conventions in Australia regulate the
operation of government starting at the time an election is called); Claude Klein, The
Powers of the Caretaker Government: Are They Really Unlimited?, 12 ISR. L. REV. 271
(1977) (examining the powers of caretaker governments); John Wilson, The Status of
the Caretaker Convention in Canada, 18 CAN. PARLIAMENTARY REV. 12 (1995)
(discussing the role of constitutional conventions in regulating the behavior of
Canadian governments during the transition period).
5.
In fact, comparative literature attributes the frequent occurrence of
caretaker governments and the extended duration of their terms to the proportionalrepresentation elections method used in some parliamentary systems. See, e.g., Boston
et al., supra note 3, at 631 ("While periods of caretaker government occur in all
parliamentary democracies, they tend to be both more frequent and more protracted in
countries with proportional representation."). In New Zealand, since the elections
system changed to mixed-member proportional representation in 1996, there have been
cases in which a caretaker government served up to two months after elections. See id.
at 639 (discussing an interregnum in New Zealand at the end of 1996). Belgium, with
its proportional-representation election method to the federal Chamber of
Representatives, set a world record for a caretaker government that served 541 days
during peacetime. Belgium Swears in New Government Headed by Elio Di Rupo, BBC
NEWS (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16042750. India, too,
suffers from frequent and prolonged caretaker administrations as the result of the need
to build coalition governments. See Meenu Roy, The Caretaker Government: Need for
Fresh Guidelines, in REVIEWING THE CONSTITUTION 94-102 (B.L. Fadia ed., 2001)
(examining the "status and powers of a caretaker government"); H.R. Saviprasad,
Caretaker Government-Extent of Powers, 12 CENT. INDIA L.Q. 397, 398-99 (1999)
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developed in the United States, where the governing norm is that
there is only one president at a time, the incumbent president, who is
fully authorized to deal with all matters and his or her discretion is
unfettered. 6 In fact, U.S. lame-duck presidents are famous for their
"midnight actions,"7 which may include controversial pardons,
appointments, regulations, and even the signing of international
8
agreements.
It could be argued that the difference between these various
countries' experiences should be attributed to the nature of the
constitutional system, whether parliamentary or presidential:

(discussing the prevalence of caretaker governments since the "pressures and pulls of
coalition politics" cause many governments to fall before their terms are completed).
6.
The phrase "there is only one president at a time" has become "a mantra of
the transition" from George W. Bush to Barack Obama. Steven Lee Myers & Helene
Cooper, Obama Defers to Bush, for Now, on Gaza Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/29/washington/29diplo.html.
7.
Midnight actions are last-term actions taken by lame-duck presidents. See
Jay Cochran III, The Cinderella Constraint: Why Regulations Increase Significantly
During Post-Election Quarters 2-3 (Mar. 8, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://mercatus.org/sites/default/filesIThe-Cinderella-Constraint(1).pdf (discussing
the significant increase in regulation during the final three months of President Jimmy
Carter's administration). Midnight actions are sometimes even described as
manifesting the "Cinderella constraint" under which lame-duck presidents must
conclude business before midnight of the president-elect's inauguration day. See id. at
4 ("[T]hey turn back into ordinary citizens at the stroke of midnight.").
In the recent decade, the phenomenon of lame-duck presidents received
8.
renewed attention from a small and influential segment of American law professors.
See BRUCE ACKERMAN,

THE

CASE AGAINST

LAMEDUCK

IMPEACHMENT

9 (1999)

(criticizing the House's
[hereinafter ACKERMAN, LAMEDUCK IMPEACHMENT]
impeachment of President Bill Clinton while the House was lame duck); Jack M.
Beermann & William P. Marshall, The ConstitutionalLaw of Presidential Transitions,
84 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1255 (2006) (exploring the arguments concerning whether
constitutional principles exist to guide presidential conduct during transition periods
and, if so, their scope); Jack M. Beermann, PresidentialPower in Transitions, 83 B.U.
L. REV. 947, 953 (2003) (using the transition from the Clinton Administration to the
Bush Administration to explore possible reforms to assist future incoming
administrations in successfully tackling the wake of midnight regulation left by
predecessors); Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing.- Entrenching Policies and
Personnel Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 557 (2003)
[hereinafter Mendelson, Agency Burrowing] (arguing that "agency burrowing" can in
fact positively contribute to the responsibility of regulatory agencies and that we
should thus adopt a "more functional means of ensuring agency legitimacy"); Nina A.
Mendelson, Quick off the Mark? In Favor of Empowering the President-Elect, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 464, 467 (2009) (investigating whether a president-elect should
be given authority to exercise more power prior to inauguration); Nagle, supra note 2,
at 317-19 (discussing President John Adam's lame-duck actions leading to Madison v.
Marbury); John Copeland Nagle, A Twentieth Amendment Parable, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.
470, 477 (1997) (discussing the Twentieth Amendment, which was enacted to minimize
lame-duck periods). See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING
FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY (2005)

(discussing the deadlock that gripped the electoral college at the end of President
Adams's term and providing a new understanding of the transformative roles that both
the presidency and the Court played since the early days of the republic).
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Parliamentary systems by their nature better deal with transitional
governments than presidential systems. Thus, they do not exhibit the
same abuse of caretaker power. Since a president is directly elected
by the people, he or she enjoys full authority even as a lame duck. In
contrast, caretaker governments are more subdued because they have
no independent mandate from the people and have lost the indirect
authority from the people, through a parliament, during transition.9
In addition, as directly elected chief executives, presidents enjoy
unilateral powers that are usually not available to their prime
minister counterparts in parliamentary systems. 1°
However, Israel's experience seems to disprove this dichotomy
between the happy story of caretaker governments in parliamentary
systems and the failed story of U.S. lame-duck presidents. Though a
parliamentary system, Israel has a long history of abuse of caretaker
power.
Against the backdrop of an enduring emergency and ongoing
threat to its security, Israel's vulnerability is only exacerbated by the
high rate of executive turnover. Although its Basic Law: The Knesset
defines the Knesset's (Israel's Parliament) term of office-and by
11
inference also that of the government-as a stable four-year term,
surprisingly, Israel has had thirty-two governments during the past
eighteen Knesset terms. 12 Governments have not survived more than
an average of twenty-two months since the state was founded because
of the combined effects of its parliamentary system, proportionalrepresentation election method, and a low electoral threshold of 2
percent. 13 The period of transition can stretch for many months-

9.
In fact, this was my initial thought on the subject. See Rivka Weill,
Twilight Time: On the Authority of Caretaker Government, 13 LAW & GOVT 167, 204
(2010).
10.
See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV.
633, 643-64 (2000) (discussing a possible cycle of impasse between Congress and the
executive that may result in the President relying on his authority to engage in
unilateral action).
11.
See Basic Law: The Knesset, 5718-1958, SH No. 244 p. 69, § 8 (Isr.),
available at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Politicsbasictoc.html
("The
term of office of the Knesset shall be four years from the day on which it is elected.").
12.
See
History
of
the
Knesset-Overview,
THE
KNESSET,
http://www.knesset.gov.il/history/eng/eng~histall.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2012)
(providing factual statistics for the past eighteen Knesset terms).
13.
Lacking a personal electoral mandate, prime ministers have had to build
their government on a coalition of many parties in order to master a Knesset majority.
See The Work of the Knesset: Responsibilities, Roles and Authority, THE KNESSET,

http://www.knesset.gov.illbirthday/engfKnessetWork-eng.htm
(last visited Oct. 27,
2012) (discussing the vast array of parliamentary groups that comprise the Knesset).
Thus, coalition members representing a small segment of the public are able to topple
the government and force new elections. See The Electoral System in Israel, THE
KNESSET, http://www.knesset.gov.illdescriptionleng/eng-mimshalbeh.htm (last visited
Oct. 27, 2012) (discussing the 2-percent-threshold system and the absolute majority
needed to force an early election).
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from six months before elections to a few months following
elections. 14 Israeli caretaker governments serve an average of eighty
days (eleven weeks).
During these transition periods, caretaker governments in Israel
acted in ways resembling lame-duck presidents in the United States,
who have sought to make public-sector appointments, conduct
international negotiations, or embark on military operations before
relinquishing the reins of power. 15 For example, lame-duck President
George W. Bush finalized a bilateral military accord with the Iraqi
government against the wishes of President-elect Barack Obama,
Congress, and the American people. 16 President Bill Clinton signed
the Rome Statute, the treaty establishing the International Criminal
Court, 1 7 which led the newly elected President Bush to take the
remarkable and unprecedented act of "unsigning" the treaty.' 8
Further back in U.S. history, lame-duck President Jimmy Carter
signed the Algiers Declarations on his last day in office in return for
the release of American hostages held in Iran. This was done despite
(or perhaps because of) the fact that the new President-elect, Ronald
Reagan, ran on the opposite platform of taking a harsh nonnegotiable stand against Iran. 19

14.
Basic Law: The Government, 5761-2001, SH No. 1780 p. 158, §§ 8-10, 11,
30 (Isr.); Basic Law: The Knesset, 5718-1958, SH No. 244 p. 69, § 35 (Isr.).
15.
See infra Parts III, IV (discussing the three areas in which Israeli caretaker
governments most readily act and examining the different reactions to each in Israeli
jurisprudence).
16.
See Ryan Patrick Phair, The Lame Duck Presidency:A Case for Restraint on
'Midnight' Actions During the Transition Period, ACSLAw.ORG, 8-13 (Dec. 2008),
("A significant source of
http://www.acslaw.org/files/Phair%201ssue%2OBrief.pdf
controversy in the current transition period is the Bush administration's attempt to
secure a comprehensive bilateral accord with the government of Iraq that would govern
U.S. policy in Iraq going forward.").
See Press Release, Sen. Jesse Helms, Helms on Clinton ICC Signature:
17.
This Decision Will Not Stand (Dec. 31, 2000), available at http://www.amicc.org/
docs/HelmsSign.pdf ("President Clinton's decision to sign the Rome treaty
establishing an International Criminal Court in his final days in office is as outrageous
as it is inexplicable."). Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms
criticized Clinton's signature of the International Criminal Court's treaty as a "blatant
attempt by a lame-duck President to tie the hands of his successor." Id.
18.
See Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2061, 2085-86 (2003)
(investigating the legal consequences attached to signing treaties). Though a signed
treaty is not finalized until ratification, it does impose on the state signing the treaty
interim international obligations to keep from acting in a way that would frustrate the
draft treaty. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (discussing the "[o]bligation not to defeat
the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force").
19.
See Nancy Amoury Combs, Carter, Reagan, and Khomeini: Presidential
Transitions and InternationalLaw, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 303, 320-22 (2001) (discussing
President-elect Reagan's public demonization of Iran and stating that "it was no
coincidence that the governments reached agreement and adhered to the Algiers
Declarations on President Carter's last full day in office").
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These midnight actions of lame-duck U.S. presidents have their
roots in the beginning of the republic. In fact, the famous Marbury v.
Madison case 20 dealt with massive midnight appointments to the
judiciary made by President John Adams in his last days in office in
order to entrench Federalist agendas. When the Federalists realized
that they had lost control of Congress and the presidency for the first
time since the Constitution was adopted, they exploited the lameduck period to decide contested international issues, enact statutes,
and make pivotal appointments, including the appointment of Chief
21
Justice John Marshall.
Similarly, the Israeli caretaker government, headed by Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert, embarked on Operation Cast Lead in Gaza,
which was the subject of fierce international criticism that
culminated in the now-refuted Goldstone report. 22 Further back,
Prime Minister Menachem Begin bombed the nuclear reactor in Iraq
on June 7, 1981, shortly before the June 30th election date. He did
this out of concern that the Labor Party would gain power, and "the
government headed by Peres would be incapable of making such a
decision and carrying it out. ' 2 3 Begin took this action even though he
knew that his likely successor, opposition leader Shimon Peres, was
24
against it.
Midnight actions of Israeli caretaker governments do not consist
of military operations alone. They also include acceleration of peace
negotiations in attempts to reach agreements or finalize
understandings before losing power. In fact, the landmark 2001 case
of Weiss v. Prime Minister of Israel,25 which set the legal standard for
caretaker government conduct, dealt with accelerated peace
negotiations with the Palestinian Authority conducted by Prime

20.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
21.
See Nagle, supra note 2, at 322-37 (discussing the actions taken by the
Sixth Congress's lame-duck session beginning in December 1800); Jack N. Rakove, The
Original Justifications for Judicial Independence, 95 GEO. L.J. 1061, 1072 (2007)
(investigating the actions taken by the defeated lame-duck Federalist party after losing
not only the presidency but also control of Congress in 1800).
22.
See Richard Goldstone, Reconsidering the Goldstone Report on Israel and
War Crimes, WASH. POST, April 1, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
reconsidering-the-goldstone.report-on-israel-and-war-crimes/2011/04/01/AFglllJC
_print.html (discussing how Goldstone would have changed the Goldstone Report had
he known then what he has subsequently discovered about the Gaza War); infra Part
IV.B (discussing Operation Cast Lead, the military campaign in Gaza and focus of the
Goldstone Report). For the Goldstone Report, see Rep. of the Human Rights Council,
12th Sess., Sept. 14-Oct. 2, 2009, U.N. Doc. A/12/48 [hereinafter Goldstone Report],
available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/englishlbodieslhrcouncil/specialsession/9/docs/
UNFFMGCReport.PDF.
23.
SHLOMO NAKDIMON, TAMMuz IN FLAMES: THE BOMBING OF THE IRAQI
REACTOR-THE STORY OF THE OPERATION 209 (1993).
24.
See id. at 192-229.

25.

HCJ 5167/00 Weiss v. Prime Minister of Isr. 55(2) PD 455 [2001] (Isr.).

[VOL,45.138-1
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Minister Ehud Barak's government twelve days before elections, after
the government lost a no-confidence parliamentary motion and its
coalition fell apart over these very talks. 26 More recently, Prime
Minister Olmert attempted to conclude the deal for release of the
kidnapped soldier Gilad Shalit in exchange for Palestinian prisoners
held by Israel in his last days in office-after it was known that
Benyamin Netanyahu would replace him-but failed. 27 Last minute
actions of transitional governments are thus of potential common
concern to both presidential and parliamentary systems, though
Israel is quite exceptional among parliamentary systems in having
these widespread abuses of caretaker power.
In both the United States and Israel, constitutional conventions
28
that restrict transitional executive actions did not properly develop.
However, the countries depart in how their legal systems have
reacted to the challenge. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court-where no
cases have arisen, and even if they were to arise, the issue would
most likely be treated as nonjusticiable 29-the Israeli Supreme Court
treats the exercise of caretaker government's authority as a
justiciable issue. In the landmark Weiss case, the court ruled that
caretaker governments enjoy full authority as regular governments,
but should nonetheless act with restraint, unless there is a "vital
public need" at stake. 30 The Israeli Supreme Court actively
supervises the application of this standard. In fact, between
December 2008 and January 2009, petitioners filed numerous

26.
27.

of

Gild

See infra Part III.A.1 (discussing the Weiss decision).
See Prime Minister's Media Adviser, Special Cabinet Meeting on the Release

Shalit,

ISR.

MINISTRY

OF

FOREIGN

AFF.

(Mar.

17,

2009),

http://www.mfa.gov.illMFA/Government/Communiques/2009/Special-Cabinet-meeting
_release_Gilad_Shalit_17-Mar-2009.htm (discussing the cabinet meeting held to
consider the possibilities for securing the release of Gilad Shalit).
It should be noted that Ireland and Germany, too, are quite exceptional
28.
among parliamentary systems in having no conventions that restrict caretaker actions.
MICHAEL LAVER & KENNETH A. SHEPSLE, MAKING AND BREAKING GOVERNMENTS:
CABINETS AND LEGISLATURES IN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES 47 (1996) [hereinafter
LAVER & SHEPSLE, MAKING AND BREAKING GOVERNMENTS]; Boston et al., supra note 3,
at 633-34; Laver & Shepsle, supra note 3. However, in Germany, this does not raise
great concern as only a constructive vote of no confidence can lead to the fall of the
government, and then an alternative government is formed by definition. See LAVER &
SHEPSLE, MAKING AND BREAKING GOVERNMENTS, supra ("[A] constructive vote-of-noconfidence procedure means that an alternative cabinet is proposed as part of the
original no-confidence motion."); Laver & Shepsle, supra note 3 (same). In Ireland,
caretaker governments act with full vigor and enjoy full legitimacy. See LAVER &
SHEPSLE, MAKING AND BREAKING GOVERNMENTS, supra ("[In Ireland,] the outgoing
cabinet continues with more or less undiminished powers until an alternative is sworn
in.").
29.
See Beermann & Marshall, supra note 8, at 1270 ("There are no cases
addressing presidential duties and obligations with respect to transition, and even if a
legal dispute developed, it is likely that a court would find it nonjusticiable.").
30.
Weiss 55(2) PD at 469.
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petitions against actions pursued by Olmert's caretaker government,
31
and the court decided all on the merits.
Treating caretaker governments' actions as justiciable is
exceptional in comparative terms. 32 It is thus interesting to examine
whether the Israeli experience sets a record of successful judicial
intervention. This Article divides the Israeli Supreme Court's
decisions into three categories of caretaker action: (1) conducting
peace negotiations, (2) making public-sector appointments and
actions, and (3) distributing material goods to the public. This Article
discusses both Israeli and comparative experience with regard to each
of these categories.
Though the Israeli Supreme Court uses the same rhetoric of
Weiss in all three categories, this Article argues that de facto it
applies the Weiss standard differently, depending on the category to
which the action belongs.3 3 When examining what the court has done
(judicial results), rather than what it said (judicial reasoning), the
picture that emerges is that the court has prohibited public-sector
appointments across the board during caretaker administration,
while routinely permitting accelerated peace negotiations. 34 This
seeming contradiction is not supported by comparative treatment of
these categories. In other parliamentary systems that abide by
caretaker conventions, caretaker governments are banned from
making both significant public-sector appointments and international
agreements.
This Article offers three possible explanations for these
seemingly conflicting results: (1) the reversibility of the action taken;
(2) the importance of representing electoral opinion; and (3) the
justiciability of the issue, including the existence of alternative
remedies to the court's intervention. However, upon reflection, this
Article suggests that these three distinctions-derived from the

31.
See, e.g., AA 672/08 Israel's Broad. Auth. v. Tavor (Jan. 27, 2009), Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.); HCJ 9843/08, Legal Forum for the Land of Isr.
v. Judicial Election Comm. (Jan. 8, 2009), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.);
HCJ 10357/08, Legal Forum for the Land of Isr. v. Isr. (Dec. 9, 2008), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription) (Isr.); HCJ 9202/08, Livnat v. Prime Minister of Isr. (Dec. 4,
2008), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
32.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
33.
Other authors confined their analysis to the Weiss ruling without
considering the court's subsequent decisions. An essay by Professor Shimon Shetreet
advocates limiting the powers of a caretaker government. Shimon Shetreet, The Limits
of a Caretaker Government, in ZAMIR BOOK ON LAW, GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY 737

(Yoav Dotan & Ariel Bendor eds., 2005). In contrast, an essay by Professor Asher Maoz
asserts that the entire issue should be treated as nonjusticiable. Asher Maoz, The High
Court of Justice and the Foreign Relations of the State, 4 MAAZANEI MISHPAT (NETANYA
ACAD. C. L. REV.) 85 (2005); see also 2 AMNON RUBINSTEIN & BARAK MEDINA, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 831-34 (6th ed. 2005).

34.
See infra Part III. The discussion of Israel's treatment of caretaker
governments builds on Weill, supra note 9.
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court's opinions-should lead to results that are the opposite of what
the court decided. That is, during transition periods, peace
negotiations should have been banned, while some public-sector
appointments should have been permitted. 35 The risk of making the
wrong decisions is not a mere technicality; in this era of globalization,
media manipulation, and the use of religion as social control, a
caretaker government acting improperly can mean the difference
between a democratic government and a totalitarian one. It can also
lead to the corrosion of good faith in international relations at a time
when cross-national ties are already strained.
The troubling results of Israeli judicial decisions in the area of
caretaker action, coupled with the fact that comparative jurisdictions
treat the issue as governed by conventions alone, should not lead to
the conclusion that this topic, by its nature, is per se nonjusticiable
and cannot be successfully judicially supervised. Rather, this Article
argues that the difficulties with Israeli jurisprudence result from the
lack of detailed concrete standards for what actions are permitted
and under what circumstances they are permitted.
This Article thus proposes to explicitly yoke the need for
restraint to any contemplated "extraordinary actions"-those that are
not in the regular course of affairs. This Article explains why this is
the right standard and delineates criteria for what actions should be
treated as extraordinary. Extraordinary actions will be permitted
only if they are justified by a vital public need or if they are
preapproved by an incoming legislature. This proposed framework
may fit other countries dealing with transitional authority. While in
some countries this transitional regime may be part of the country's
soft law governed by conventions or government codes alone, as in the
countries that were formerly part of the Commonwealth, other
countries may need a more vigorous regime supervised by judicial
review, as in the case of Israel.
Part II sets forth in brief the theoretical framework for dealing
with the authority of transitional governments in parliamentary and
presidential systems. It further discusses the comparative experience
with regulating such governments. Part III analyzes Israel's
exceptional jurisprudence on caretaker actions, dividing judicial
decisions into three categories as defined above. Each category is
analyzed under both Israeli and comparative law. Part IV suggests
three explanations for the seemingly conflicting results achieved in
Israeli jurisprudence with regard to the three categories. This Article
further argues that the three explanations are ultimately
unconvincing bases on which to permit peace negotiations yet
prohibit across the board public-sector appointments during
caretaker periods. Part V suggests that Israel's jurisprudence has

35.

See infra Part IV.
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reached problematic results, not because caretaker authority cannot
be regulated by the courts, but because the courts failed to develop
concrete criteria for which actions should be allowed and under what
circumstances. This Article proposes a legal framework for a
transitional government's powers that takes into account both the
democratic drawbacks and the concern that its actions will be driven
by extraneous considerations relating to elections or the loss of its
power. This proposed framework aims to strike the proper balance
between the need for continuity of government and the desire to
protect democracy. Part VI provides a summary and conclusion.

II.

THE CHALLENGES POSED BY TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENTS

No one disputes the need to have a government in place at all
times. Nonetheless, the transition period is characterized by two
unique constitutional problems. First, there is the agency problem,
which leads to the significant concern that governments' actions will
be driven by the wrong motives. Second, transitional governments
enjoy only weak democratic legitimacy. This Article discusses each in
turn. It then offers counterarguments based on concerns about
efficiency and instrumentalism that suggest that governance must
have continuity even during transition periods. This Part concludes
with a portrayal of the comparative experience of regulating these
governments.
A. The Agency Problem
The "agency problem" describes the gap between the interests of
the representative and the interests of constituents, and the
likelihood that the former will make decisions to further his or her
own agenda at the expense of the latter.3 6 This problem is especially
acute during caretaker and lame-duck periods. The concern is that
these governments will pass resolutions and adopt measures to serve
extraneous considerations that do not reflect the common good.
Before elections, governments that operate with no fixed
electoral calendar (a situation more typical in parliamentary than
presidential systems) may try to extend their terms of office by
postponing elections for as long as possible, as has frequently

36.
See Bruce Bender & John R. Lott, Jr., Legislator Voting and Shirking: A
Critical Review of the Literature, 87 PUB. CHOICE 67, 67-68 (1996) (discussing the
mismatch between the interests of politicians and the interests of their constituents,
resulting in legislator shirking).
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occurred in Israel.3 7 Similarly, governments might take drastic
measures to influence the upcoming election's results.3 8 The greater
the fear that the political party in power will not get reelected, the
greater the risk that the caretaker or lame-duck administration will
adopt daring measures in the hope that, if the measures succeed, they
will prove fruitful in the upcoming elections. On the other hand, the
party in power may believe it has nothing to lose if its measures fail,
since it is presumed to lose the elections in any case.
The fear of extraneous considerations is especially high when it
is clear that the prime minister or key figures in the government
cannot be reelected by the people, commonly because of an illness,
criminal offense, or constitutional term limits. This fear is magnified
when the key governmental figures are not deeply affiliated with
their political party, and thus are not particularly interested in an
election victory for their party's successors. Insight from game theory
provides an analogous example: unlike a player who is contemplating
extended or repeated opportunities for gain, a player engaged in a
one-time or last-term game will choose the best individual strategy
39
over one that is socially optimal.
While agency difficulties appear even before elections, they are
largely manageable because of the impending elections, which
typically constrain even last-term executives who identify themselves
with their parties. The concern is greater in a post-election period,
after the government has lost power. In such situations, caretaker or
lame-duck governments may implement policies without concern for
the consequences of their actions. After all, the regular mechanism of
democratic checks and balances, in the form of the citizens' vote, no
longer applies to them. 40 Moreover, these governments know that
they will not have to deal with the consequences of their actions, as
responsibility is transferred to the administration being sworn in to

37.
I found that in the twelve cases in which elections were moved up in Israel,
the term of a caretaker government was especially long and lasted about 160 days,
twice as long as the average transition period of all governments in Israel. Moreover,
about 118 of the 160 days (74 percent) preceded elections. Weill, supra note 9, at 177.
38.
See Beermann, supra note 8, at 975-80 (discussing the political
consequences of last-minute measures taken by President Clinton at the end of his
time in office).
39.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, at 488-89 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961) (discussing the need for reeligibility of chief magistrates in office);
GEORGE J. MAILATH & LARRY SAMUELSON, REPEATED GAMES AND REPUTATIONS: LONG

RUN RELATIONSHIPS 1-2 (2006) ("Repeated interactions give rise to incentives that
differ fundamentally from those of isolated interactions.").
40.
See William G. Howell & Kenneth R. Mayer, The Last One Hundred Days,
35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 533, 550 (2005) ("Outgoing presidents need no longer
concern themselves about the electoral consequences of what they do during the
transition, or about how a controversial decision will affect the rest of their agendas.");
Nagle, supra note 8, at 479 ("[O]nce defeated, members were unaccountable to the
electorate.").
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office. These midnight actions may involve waste, imprudence,
unilateral controversial actions, entrenchment of policies, division of
''4 1
loot, and even leaving of "scorched earth.
Even when the ruling party apparently remains the same in
parliamentary systems, one cannot ascertain the composition of the
government or its underlying principles until it takes office and has
formed a coalition. Thus, though the agency concern is mitigated if
the ruling party remains the same, it does not vanish. The same may
be true of a president's successor from the same party, who may have
a different agenda than the lame-duck president, though the data
does suggest that midnight actions of lame-duck presidents are
42
typical when a change of party occurs.
B. The DemocraticDeficit
Caretaker and lame-duck administrations pose a democratic
challenge no less than an agency one. In a parliamentary system,
there are no separate elections for the executive branch of
government. Rather, parliamentary elections indirectly determine the
composition of the executive. The mandate of the government stems
from the elected representatives in parliament and is dependent on
43
their continued confidence.
This Article defines a caretaker government as a government
functioning in a parliamentary system in the interregnum following
elections and before the formation of a new government, or a
government whose term has ended prematurely and is functioning
until an alternative government is formed. The term of a government
may end prematurely as the result of a loss of parliament's confidence
or if parliament is dissolved. Loss of a parliament's confidence can
arise from numerous causes: elections that have redistributed
governmental power, an explicit vote of no confidence by a
parliament, failure to pass a budget law, or dissolution of the
governmental coalition. Even if a caretaker government came about
for reasons other than no confidence (such as the death of the prime
minister), once a caretaker government is formed, there is no longer
any practical significance to expressions of no confidence, since the

41.
For elaboration on these midnight actions, see Weill, supra note 2, at 110611. See also literature enumerated supra note 8.
42.
See, e.g., Beermann, supra note 8, at 951-52 (describing late-term actions,
which are designed to burden the other political party about to take over the White
House); Howell & Mayer, supra note 40, at 533-43 ("And if the sitting president (or his
party) lost the election, he has every reason to hurry through last-minute public
policies, doing whatever possible to tie his successor's hands.").
See COLIN TURPIN & ADAM TOMKINS, BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE
43.
CONSTITUTION 565-71 (6th ed. 2007) (discussing parliament and the responsibility of
government).
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aim of such a motion is to compel the resignation of the government.
Therefore, the prevailing practice in parliamentary systems is not to
express no confidence in a caretaker government. Moreover, countries
that treat the death or incapacitation of a prime minister as a cause
for caretaker governance have expressed their view that the prime
minister's identity is so vital that his or her replacement must
actively regain parliamentary confidence. When the government
became a caretaker because of the dissolution of parliament, rather
than an explicit vote of no confidence, then the government no longer
has a legislative body to account to.
Without parliament's confidence, the government's democratic
legitimacy is severely weakened. The limited democratic legitimacy
the caretaker government does enjoy is due to the imperative to
prevent a political void and ensure continuity. 44 Furthermore, if every
caretaker government suffers from a democratic deficit, a postelection caretaker government suffers it the most. Once the electorate
4 5
has spoken, its wishes must not be thwarted.
Lame-duck presidents suffer from democratic deficit too. But it
occurs later than in parliamentary systems since presidents do not
rule based on parliamentary confidence. Only after elections have
been held and their successors have been named does such
democratic deficit occur in presidential systems. 46 This is why this
Article defines a lame-duck president as a president serving after
elections, when it is clear that the incumbent is not continuing for
another term. Only at such time, does the president suffer from the
combined challenges of agency and democratic difficulties.
C. Efficiency and Instrumental Concerns
Despite the agency and democratic challenges, stability and
efficiency in the executive branch of government is vital, especially
during transitions. The Founding Fathers of the U.S. Constitution
addressed this issue when writing:

44.
See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION? 1-79 (rev. ed. 1990)
(discussing different criteria for establishing authority and the varieties of democratic
authority); Ackerman, supra note 10, at 642-88 (discussing various bases of legitimacy
and attributing representation as the main source of legitimacy of a government).
45.
It is important to distinguish between a government that has lost
parliament's confidence and a minority government. A minority government exists
through the means of outside support of members of parliament preventing its fall
since it otherwise lacks the necessary majority achieved by internal coalitions. It is
important for such a government to reach ad hoc agreements on every issue to avoid
losing power. See KAARE STROM, MINORITY GOVERNMENT AND MAJORITY RULE 3-22

(1990) (discussing the reasons for minority-government formation and the challenges it
faces).
46.
See Weill, supra note 2, at 1101-04 (discussing the democratic deficit of
lame-duck presidents).
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Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good
government. It is essential to the protection of the community against
foreign attacks: It is not less essential to the steady administration of
the laws, to the protection of property against those irregular and high
handed combinations, which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of
justice, to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of
47
ambition, of faction and of anarchy.

This continuity concern supports treating transitional governments
as enjoying the same powers as any regular government.
Other arguments favoring this position are practical. For
example, it is very difficult to determine whether an act by a
caretaker or lame-duck government is motivated by extraneous
considerations or by a desire to continue regular and legitimate
governmental activity. Some even adopt a paternalistic approach,
suggesting that ignoring the electorate might actually help the
government to make the best decisions for the people, even if these
decisions are not popular ones. Some also contend that the
government should be allowed to tie "loose ends," and that the lastminute pressure serves as a catalyst for it to do so. It is even claimed
that, in certain conditions, the appointments and regulations of a
caretaker or lame-duck government can stimulate public discussion
by putting opposing views on the agenda of the newly elected
administration. 48 This position thus maintains that instrumental
justifications support leaving these interim governments fully
authorized to handle state affairs.
D. Comparative Experience with Regulating
TransitionalGovernments
In view of the complex nature of caretaker and lame-duck
governments, one would expect the law applicable to such
governments to minimize the dangers of agency difficulties and
democratic deficits, yet provide for continuity in administration.
However, an examination of comparative-law literature reveals that
the topic is barely discussed. 4 9 Where a legal system does decide to
treat the subject, as is common in parliamentary systems that formed
part of the Commonwealth or were influenced by British law,
caretaker authority is usually treated through constitutional
conventions alone, which are not enforceable in courts. 50 In the
United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, these
conventions are even codified in formal documents, such as cabinet

47.
1961).
48.
49.
50.

THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
See Mendelson, Agency Burrowing,supra note 8, at 602.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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manuals or guidelines on the conduct of government during election
51
time.
Why is the topic, treated through constitutional conventions,
nonenforceable in court? Even countries with caretaker conventions
presume that caretaker governments enjoy the same full
constitutional authority as any regular government. 52 The
conventions thus provide flexible, nonenforceable tools that guide
caretaker governments' discretion in the exercise of their authority.
The conventions do not dictate any particular course of action, but
rather set standards for governments' behavior. Conventions are
appropriate for regulating caretaker governments as "conventions are
about defining or restricting the exercise of formal powers that exist
in law but are circumscribed in practice." 53 Furthermore, conventions
by their nature are flexible and adaptable to changing
54
circumstances.
What is the content of these caretaker conventions? These
conventions usually embody the principle of restraint. That is, a
caretaker government must act with restraint and defer any
substantial business to the next regular government, unless the issue
is routine or urgent. When the issue cannot be delayed, caretaker
governments are instructed to consult with the opposition. If the
identity of the next government is known, then the caretaker

51.
See THE CABINET MANUAL
2.27-34 (U.K.) [hereinafter UK CABINET
MANUAL], available at www.cabinetoffice.gov.uklsites/default/files/resources/cabinetmanual.pdf (providing "[a] guide to laws, conventions, and rules on the operation of
government"); GUIDELINES ON THE CONDUCT OF MINISTERS, SECRETARIES OF STATE,

EXEMPT STAFF AND PUBLIC SERVANTS DURING AN ELECTION 1-5 (2008) (Can.) [hereinafter
CANADA'S GUIDELINES], available at http://jameswjbowden.files.wordpress.con/2011/07/
guidelines-cartaker-conventionl.pdf ("While constitutionally, a government retains full
legal authority to govern during an election ... it is expected to exercise restraint in its
actions. The rationale is that ....there is no elected chamber to which the government
can be held accountable."); NEW ZEALAND CABINET MANUAL
6.16-35 (2008),
available at http://cabinetmanual.cabinetoffice.govt.nz6.16 (outlining the duties of the
current government from the time an election is called until a new government is
formed); ANNE TIERNAN & JENNIFER MENZIES, CARETAKER CONVENTIONS IN
AUSTRALASIA 134 (2007), available at http://epress.anu.edu.au/caretaker_citation.html
(detailing the current government's obligations toward the incoming government from
the time an election is called until a new government is formed).
52.
See, e.g., NEW ZEALAND CABINET MANUAL, supra note 51, T 6.16 ("[T]he
incumbent government is still the lawful executive authority, with all the powers and
responsibilities that go with executive office."); Boston et al., supra note 3, at 631
("[C]aretaker governments are generally deemed to have full executive powers.").
53.
LORNE SOSSIN & ADAM DODEK, When Silence Isn't Golden: Constitutional
Conventions, Constitutional Culture, and the Governor General, in PARLIAMENTARY
DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS 91, 93 (Peter H. Russell & Lorne Sossin eds., 2009) (discussing
the role of constitutional conventions with regard to the authority of the GovernorGeneral).
54.
Id. at 99.
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government might be instructed to follow the advice of the incoming
administration, even against its better judgment. 5
Despite the emergence of such caretaker conventions, the
literature on the subject in these countries is sparse and does not
explain why caretaker governments should be distinguished from
regular governments or why the conventions are tailored to achieve
those purposes. Nonetheless, the conventions seem to work as,
overall, there are no major reports of abuse of caretaker power in
these countries.56
In contrast, no such conventions developed in the U.S.
presidential system to deal with lame-duck presidents' authority. On
the contrary, there are numerous articles devoted to documenting the
abuse of lame-duck U.S. presidents' power. 57 The question arises: Are
these abuses inherent to the nature of presidential systems, or can
they be attributed to the lack of development of caretaker
conventions? Israel provides an interesting case study in this regard.
Though Israel is a parliamentary system, no constitutional
conventions restricting caretaker power developed within58 it, and it
provides numerous instances of abuses of caretaker power.
Israel had the opportunity to develop or recognize these
caretaker conventions. Instead, it opted to explicitly reject them. In
the 1976 major coalition crisis that eventually led to an election and
the rise of the Likud Party to power for the first time since the state
was founded, the government appointed a public committee to
investigate the regulation of caretaker governments. 59 This

55.

See CANADA'S GUIDELINES, supra note 51, at 1-2 ("[C]onsultation with the

Opposition may be appropriate ....

"); NEW ZEALAND CABINET MANUAL, supra note 51,

6.24 ("[T]he outgoing government should ... act on the advice of the incoming
government on any matter of such constitutional, economic or other significance that it
cannot be delayed until the new government formally takes office-even if the outgoing
goverrnment disagrees with the course of action proposed."); TIERNAN & MENZIES, supra
note 51, at 134 ("Any reference to post election action should be in terms of the
'incoming government."'); UK CABINET MANUAL, supra note 51,
2.27-.34.
56.
For the sparse literature on the subject, see supra notes 3-4 and
accompanying texts.
57.
See supra notes 6, 8 and accompanying text.
58.
See supranotes 23-27 and accompanying text.
59.
The committee was appointed to deal first and foremost with the problem
that, at the time, the Basic Law: The Government provided for a freeze in the
composition of caretaker governments, such that no minister could have resigned or
joined. The committee recommended abolishing this state of affairs. BERENSON,
COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE SUBJECT OF TRANSITIONAL AND CARETAKER
GOVERNMENTS 1-6 [hereinafter BERENSON REPORT] (unpublished) (on file with
author). The Knesset amended the Basic Law in accordance with the committee's
recommendation, and there is no such provision in the current Basic Law. Basic Law:
The Government, 5761-2001, SH No. 1780 p. 158, § 30(b) (Isr.), available at
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special]eng/basicl4-eng.htm ("When a new Knesset has
been elected or the Government has resigned ... the outgoing Government shall
continue to carry out its functions until the new Government is constituted.").

1400

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W

[VOL. 451-1381

committee, known as the Berenson Committee after Justice Tzvi
Berenson who served as its head, recommended that a caretaker
government in Israel enjoy the same powers as a regular government.
It explicitly rejected the convention of restraint developed in other
parliamentary systems. In the words of the Committee:
For practical reasons and given the country's special circumstances, the
committee decided that restricting the actions of a caretaker
government could cause an excessively drastic shift from a regular
government to a caretaker government, impair the administration's
proper functioning, and tie its hands from carrying out vital operations
of state institutions in the event of a sudden crisis. Vague phrases like
the "regular course of affairs" cannot guarantee the necessary degree of
60
certitude for proper constitutional activity.

The frequency of caretaker governments in Israel and their long
terms in office seem to support this position. But, this rejection of
caretaker conventions led to abuse of Israeli caretaker governments'
power. This abuse is atypical of parliamentary systems with
caretaker conventions, even when these governments reign for long
periods.
Into this vacuum in the regulation of Israeli caretaker
governments stepped the Israeli Supreme Court. It decided to treat
the issue of caretaker authority as a justiciable matter, in contrast to
both other parliamentary systems, which treat the issue through
conventions, and the U.S. presidential system, which leaves the field
wholly unregulated. 6 ' In the following Parts, this Article examines
the court's jurisprudence in the field and explores its lessons
regarding the possibility of treating this topic as justiciable. In
particular, the Article examines whether the court's jurisprudence is
a success story or is proof that the issue cannot be regulated by the
courts.

III.

TREATING CARETAKER ACTION AS JUSTICIABLE

While Israel's Basic Law: The Government, which forms part of
Israel's formal constitution, 62 merely states that a caretaker
government continues "to carry out its functions until the new
Government is constituted," 63 the constitution does not explicitly

60.
BERENSON REPORT, supra note 59, at 6.
61.
See supranotes 4-8 and accompanying text.
The court decided that Israel's Basic Laws amount to its formal
62.
constitution in the famous decision: CA 6821193 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal
Collective Vill. 49(4) PD 221 [1995] (Isr.), translated in 1995-2 ISR. L. REPORTS 1,
available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files-eng/93/210/068/zO1/93068210.zOl.pdf. See
Rivka Weill, The Israeli Case for Judicial Review and Why WE Should Care, 30
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 349 (2012), for a discussion of the case,
63.
Basic Law: The Government, 5761-2001, SH No. 1780 p. 158, § 30(b).

20121

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSITIONS

define caretaker powers. Instead, courts addressed this issue once
abuse of caretaker power became noticed and prevalent. This Article
suggests that Weiss, 64 the landmark Israeli ruling on this subject,
was later implemented in three distinct spheres: (1) peace
negotiations, (2) public-sector appointments, and (3) the distribution
of material goods. This Article further argues that, although the
courts use uniform rhetoric when applying Weiss and seem to employ
the same standards when evaluating each of these spheres, their
rulings show differences in their de facto treatment of these divergent
spheres of action. Furthermore, this Article examines both Israeli and
comparative attitudes toward each of the three spheres and finds no
support for Israel's diverse treatment of peace negotiations, on the
one hand, and public-sector appointments, on the other. In contrast,
the unique judicial treatment of the sphere of distributing material
goods to the public during transitional times finds explanation and
support in this Article. The next Part will discuss whether this
difference in Israel's jurisprudence with regard to peace negotiations
and public-sector appointments amounts to a troubling inconsistency
or whether it has adequate justification. This in turn may reflect on
courts' capacity to regulate caretaker action.
A. ConductingPeace Negotiations
1.

The Weiss Decision

After the Berenson Committee Report, the next important
milestone on the subject of caretaker governments' powers was the
Weiss decision. While the Berenson Committee of the late 1970s
recommended leaving caretaker authority aligned with that of
regular governments-that is, with no special restrictions-the Weiss
decision of the early 2000s set standards for legitimate caretaker
behavior.
Weiss was handed down during Prime Minister Barak's
administration, when the prevailing law provided for direct elections
to the office of prime minister. 65 On the eve of Barak's departure for
the Camp David conference in early July 2000, right-wing political
parties deserted the government, leaving Barak with the support of

64.
HCJ 5167/00 Weiss v. Prime Minister of Isr. 55(2) PD 455 [2001] (Isr.).
Following the Weiss decision, the Attorney General formulated rules for the conduct of
caretaker governments, especially regarding appointments in the public sector. See
ATTORNEY

GENERAL

GUIDELINES

REGARDING

ELECTION

ISSUES,

available at

http://www.knesset.gov.il/electionsi8heb/law/LegalAdviser.pdf.
65.
Israel has a pure parliamentary system with the exception of the elections
in 1996-2003, when direct elections for the office of prime minister were held under
Basic Law: The Government. See RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 33, at 822-23.
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fewer than thirty Knesset members. 66 A majority of fifty-four to fiftytwo (with seven abstentions) in the Knesset passed a no-confidence
motion against the Prime Minister on July 10, 2000.67 Yet the
government did not fall because the motion fell short of an absolute
majority (sixty-one Knesset members). The Second Intifada uprising,
also known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada, broke out shortly thereafter in
September 2000.68
According to the court in Weiss, "The negotiation [for peace with
the Palestinian authority] and its content are a subject of sharp
debate in Israel. Against this background-and against the
background of other internal matters-the Prime Minister, Mr. Ehud
Barak, resigned from his position as Prime Minister." 69 Direct
elections for the office of prime minister were scheduled for February
6, 2001.70 Despite Barak's resignation, his government continued to
conduct peace negotiations with the Palestinians.7 1 These
negotiations started many months before the resignation and
continued as late as twelve days before the elections, with the goal of
72
achieving an agreement before elections.
In a petition to the High Court of Justice, Professor Hillel Weiss
argued that it was unreasonable for a government to conduct such
fateful negotiations involving painful territorial concessions so close
to the elections without the support of the Knesset. 73 A remedy was
sought that would order the government to stop the negotiations until
a new government formed following elections.
In a judgment delivered by President Aharon Barak, the High
Court of Justice dismissed the petition on the merits.74 It was
unanimously ruled that a caretaker government enjoys the same
powers as any regular government. 75 Six of the seven justices added
that, in exercising its authority, a caretaker government enjoys a

Emanuele Ottolenghi, Explaining Systemic Failure: The Direct Elections
66.
System and Israel's Special Elections of February 2001, 8 ISR. AFF. 134, 146 (2002).
Maoz, supra note 33, at 86.
67.
68.
Id.
Weiss 55(2) PD at 463.
69.
70.
Id. (TUrkel, J., dissenting).
71.
Id. (majority opinion).
72.
Id. at 463 (majority opinion), 475 (Tiirkel, J., dissenting).
73.
See id. at 463 (majority opinion) (referencing petitioner's argument that
reasonableness limited the government's actions to ongoing operations). It should be
noted that Israel's Supreme Court sits also as a High Court of Justice. Basic Law: The
Judiciary, 5744-1984, SH No. 110 p. 78, § 15 (Isr.).
See Weiss 55(2) PD at 455, 473 (denying petition on the grounds that the
74.
government's actions did not deviate from the proper range of reasonableness). It
should be noted that Israel's Chief Justice is called President.
75.
See id. at 468 (majority opinion), 474 (Levin, Deputy President, concurring),
475 (Tiurkel, J., dissenting), 477 (Zamir, J., concurring) (agreeing that there is no
formal limitation on the powers of an outgoing government).
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narrower range of "reasonableness" discretion than a regular
76
government, at least in certain matters.
The justices, however, were divided in their reasoning, as well as
on the outcome of the judgment. Six of the seven justices favored
dismissing the petition, but only four of them based their dismissal on
the merits. 77 Two others, Deputy President Shlomo Levin and Justice
Yitzhak Zamir, cited threshold causes that could be described as lack
of justiciability and therefore refrained from legitimizing the
government's actions on the merits.7 8 Justice Yaakov Tiirkel, in a
minority opinion, opted to accept the petition because the government
failed to show any specific urgent need to conduct the negotiations
79
twelve days before the elections.
In the majority opinion, President Barak held that the Basic
Law: The Government adopted the principle of continuity by allowing
the outgoing government to function until a new government is
formed, and the Basic Law does not confine the powers of a caretaker
government to the regular course of affairs.8 0 The court also noted
that the Berenson Committee had rejected the idea of limiting the
powers of a caretaker government, both because it was impractical
and because it would make it impossible to properly deal with a
sudden crisis.8 1 The court therefore ruled that limiting the powers of
a caretaker government should be done, if at all, by way of legislation
and not by judicial decision.8 2 The court further noted that no
constitutional convention ("custom") has developed in Israel that
3
restricts caretaker action.8

76.
See id. (agreeing that the application of the reasonableness inquiry changes
when applied to outgoing governments). Deputy President Shlomo Levin did not
express any views on the matter. Id. at 474 (Levin, Deputy President, concurring).
77.
See id. at 473 (majority opinion) (finding that the actions of the outgoing
government did not deviate from the range of reasonableness).
78.
See id. at 474 (Levin, Deputy President, concurring), 477-80 (Zamir, J.,
concurring) (refraining from the reasonableness inquiry of other justices).
79.
See id. at 475-77 (Tiirkel, J., dissenting) (arguing that the range of
reasonableness continuously narrows as the Prime Minister's term approaches its end).
80.
See id. at 465 (majority opinion) (explaining that the ongoing operations
approach was used in other countries but no such formal limitation existed in Israeli
law). The case relies on the old and repealed version of Basic Law: The Government,
however similar provisions exist in the new Basic Law: The Government, 5761, SH No.
1780 p. 158, § 30(b) (Isr.) ("[T]he outgoing Government shall continue to carry out its
functions until the new Government is constituted.").
81.
See Weiss 55(2) PD at 466 (using the Berenson Committee Report as
support for refusing to construct a formal limitation on an outgoing government's
power).
82.
See id. at 466-68 ("[IThe Knesset as an establishing authority may... limit
the powers of an outgoing government, if it sees fit .... ).
83.
See id. at 468 ("[It has not been proven to us ... [that there is] the
existence of a constitutional custom according to which the outgoing government has
only ongoing powers (or 'maintenance' powers).").
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At the same time, the court ruled that the nature of a caretaker
government would be reflected in its exercise of governmental
discretion.8 4 In exercising its authority, a caretaker government has a
narrower range of reasonableness than a regular government.8 5 The
criterion was that a caretaker government must act with restraint,
unless there is a "vital public need for action. '8 6 Even if it is essential
to take action, the caretaker government must act with
proportionality in fulfilling that need. 8 7 The court emphasized that
the test is not whether an action is regular or extraordinary, but
whether the circumstances required action or restraint.8 8 Exercising
restraint is the default position, especially after elections when a new
89
government is being formed.
Rather than rule it nonjusticiable, the court concluded that there
was a "vital public need" to conduct peace talks twelve days prior to
elections, a need that prevailed over the government's limited
mandate. 90 While Basic Law: The Government does not explicitly
address the realm of foreign relations, the court held that this issue
was within the government's authority since the state's executive
91
branch holds both residual power and the authority to declare war.
The court treated foreign relations and state security as political
92
matters, in which every government is entitled to broad discretion.

84.
See id. at 469 (explaining that a caretaker government must act with the
restraint appropriate for an outgoing government).
See id. at 470 ("[Tjhe range of reasonableness of the prime minister who
85.
has resigned ... is narrower than the range of reasonableness of a prime minister and
government who are operating normally.").
86.
See id. at 469 (explaining that the duty of restraint does not apply when
there is a "vital public need to act").
87.
See id. (explaining that when a vital need exists, the government must act
in appropriate measure).
is, whether
in
the overall
88.
See id. ("The correct question
balance ...

restraint or action is required.").

89.
See id. at 470 (giving various examples of inappropriate post-election
actions for an outgoing government, such as appointing senior officials). It is
noteworthy that the court sought to focus on one form of caretaker government-the
one that is created following the resignation of a prime minister. Id. at 468. In doing so,
it did not explain why the reason for bringing about a caretaker government might
affect the law applicable to it.
90.
See id. (noting that it is appropriate for an outgoing prime minister and his
cabinet to manage foreign policy or defense from war when there is a "vital public
need").
See Basic Law: The Government, 5761-2001, SH No. 1780 p. 158, §§ 1, 32,
91.
40 (Isr.) (granting the executive branch residual authority and the power to declare
war). Similar provisions existed in the old version of the law.
92.
See Weiss 55(2) PD at 472 (stating that the court will not replace the
government's foreign and defense discretion with its own).
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It would be up to the Knesset and the public, not the court, to oversee
93
the government's actions in these sensitive spheres.
In failing to intervene, the court relied on, inter alia, the
declaration of the Attorney General that, if Israel and the Palestinian
Authority were to sign an agreement, its international as well as
internal validity would be explicitly contingent upon its ratification
by the Knesset 94-a validity clause which raises questions about the
role of caretaker governments in international relations, addressed
95
later in the Article.
The Weiss decision thus followed the Berenson Committee's
position in holding both that caretaker governments enjoy the same
authority as regular governments and that the criterion of the
regular course of affairs should not be the measurement for the
legitimacy of caretaker action. However, it deviated from the
Committee's position in its willingness to regulate caretaker action
such that caretaker governments must act with restraint unless there
is a vital public interest that requires action. What is of further
interest is that the court did not wait for the issue to be regulated by
amendment of the Basic Law but rather took upon itself the role of
judging the legitimacy of caretaker action.
2.

The Livnat Decision

The same issue that was addressed in Weiss resurfaced in
December 2008 when the caretaker government headed by Prime
Minister Olmert resumed peace negotiations with Syria and the
Palestinian Authority, including discussions about the Golan Heights
and Jerusalem. 96 Negotiations were conducted even though Olmert
had resigned as prime minister, and elections were pending because
Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, his replacement from his party, had
failed to form a new government. 9 7 Knesset member Limor Livnat

93.
See id. The court held that nonintervention was consistent with precedent.
The court dismissed previous petitions concerning negotiations for the Oslo
agreements, the Golan Heights, and even the release of terrorists. Id.
94.
See id. at 473 (referring to the Israeli Attorney General's declaration that
any agreement between outgoing Israeli government representatives and Palestinian
representatives would be conditional until approved by the Knesset).
95.
See infra Part W.A. It is interesting to note that, in the elections for the
office of prime minister on February 6, 2001, Ariel Sharon received 62.3 percent of the
votes, while Ehud Barak received 37.7 percent. According to commentators, the
elections were more indicative of a defeat for Barak and his policy than a victory for
Sharon. See Ottolenghi, supra note 66, at 150.
96.
See HCJ 9202/08 Livnat v. Prime Minister of Isr., at 3 (Dec. 4, 2008), Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
97.
See Aluf Benn & Haaretz Correspondent, Does Failure To Form a Gov't
Make Tzipi Livni a Loser?, HAARETZ, Oct. 26, 2008, http://www.haaretz.comprintedition/news/analysis-does-failure-to-form-a-gov-t-make-tzipi-livni-a-loser- 1.256064
(reporting that Livni was unable to form a government without calling elections).
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petitioned the High Court, challenging the "reasonableness" of
conducting peace negotiations under these circumstances. 98 The court
dismissed the petition, relying directly on Weiss. 99
This later judicial decision interpreted Weiss as allowing a
caretaker government to-conduct peace negotiations. 100 Furthermore,
in Livnat, the court did not make its decision contingent on the
government's commitment to include an explicit stipulation in the
agreement (if reached), stating that its international validity is
dependent on the Knesset's approval. 1 1 Instead, the court focused
only on the agreement's internal validity: "By law, the government's
decisions regarding a change in the status of the Golan Heights or
Jerusalem require Knesset's approval by a majority of its
members."'10 2 Similarly, the court dismissed on the same grounds a
petition filed the same month against the release of Palestinian
prisoners for the Muslim Eid al-Adha (Festival of Sacrifice) holiday as
a good-faith gesture in the context of peace negotiations with the
103
Palestinians.
In summary, while Weiss established the principle that a
caretaker government must act with restraint unless there is a "vital
public need for action," the court de facto treats peace negotiations as
always fulfilling the "vital public need" requirement, even when
negotiations are conducted just days before elections. The court does
not view the issue as nonjusticiable, but rather decides on the merits
that peace negotiations are allowed. The court also does not probe the
concrete circumstances surrounding each negotiation, nor does it
suggest that, in principle, it is unreasonable for a caretaker
government to conduct international peace negotiations, which would
have made the Weiss outcome an exception to the general rule. In
failing to firmly establish that principle, the court's rulings have been
interpreted for the convenience of caretaker governments, who
repeatedly accelerate peace negotiations during their caretaker term,
relying on the legitimacy granted to those actions by the Israeli
Supreme Court. In this sense, the court's rulings function in the way
that James Bradley Thayer has warned: they shift responsibility from

98.
See Liunat, HCJ 9202/08, at 3.
99.
See id.
100.
See id. at 6.
101.
See infra Part IV.A (discussing the role of caretaker governments in
international relations); cf. tCJ 5167/00 Weiss v. Prime Minister of Isr., 55(2) PD 455,
473 [2001] (Isr.) (stating that its decision relies on the Attorney General's specific
commitment that were agreements to be made by the outgoing government's
representatives, such agreements would include a specific stipulation that they are
conditional until approved by the Knesset).
102.
See Livnat, HCJ 9202/08, 5.
103.
See HCJ 10357/08 Legal Forum for the Land of Isr. v. Gov't of Isr., at 31
(Dec. 9, 2008), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
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the elected branches to the court and inhibit, rather than enhance,
democratic accountability. 104
3.

Comparative Experience with International Agreements

Israeli governments did not shy from embarking on military
operations or, conversely, accelerating peace negotiations during
caretaker periods, as discussed above.' 0 5 Furthermore, the Israeli
Supreme Court approved accelerating peace negotiations, believing
there was always a vital need to negotiate for peace, even during
caretaker periods.' 0 6 Reaching international agreements during a
transitional administration is especially problematic since the state is
obligated under international law to abide by the international
agreement even if a change of administration has occurred, unless
the other parties to the agreement consent to changing the
agreement.' 0 7 In fact, the behavior of Israeli caretaker
administrations in the international arena stands in sharp contrast
to the prevailing norm in the parliamentary model of caretaker
governments. Under this model, caretaker governments are
constrained by constitutional conventions from committing the state
in the international arena.' 0 8 Thus, for example, when Winston
Churchill headed his caretaker government in 1945, he attended the
Potsdam Conference that held international discussions between the
Three Powers-the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britainregarding the future fate of the defeated Germany. 109 As the head of a
caretaker government, Churchill felt obliged to bring the leader of the
opposition and shadow prime minister, Clement Attlee, as well as the
shadow foreign secretary. 110 Attlee later replaced Churchill in the
11
talks as the Prime Minister of Britain. '

104.
See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine
of ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 155-56 (1893) ("[J]f [legislators] are wrong,
they say, the courts will correct it.").
105.
See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text (citing examples of Israeli
caretaker governments engaging in military operations and peace negotiations).
106.
See supra Part III.A.1-2.
107.
See Combs, supra note 19, at 334 ("[I] nternational law ... requires states to
honor their commitments until the other party or parties to the agreement consents to
a change."); see also discussion infra Part IV.A (comparing the international law
implications of signing versus ratifying agreements by caretaker governments).
108.
See, e.g., Boston et al., supra note 3, at 637-41 (discussing New Zealand's
caretaker government restrictions).
109.
See JOHARI, supra note 1, at 139-40 (referencing Churchill's participation
in the Potsdam Conference); see also T.D. Burridge, A Postscript to Potsdam: The
Churchill-Laski Electoral Clash, June 1945, 12 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 725, 733-37 (1977)
(detailing Churchill's efforts to arrange and participate in the Potsdam Conference).
110.
See JOHARI, supra note 1, at 140 (referencing Churchill's inclusion of
Clement Atlee and Ernest Bevin in the Potsdam Conference).
111.
See id.
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Some authors argue that U.S. presidents postpone concluding
international agreements, leaving them for the president-elect to
decide, unless the incoming administration consents to the
agreement.'1 2 But, de facto, there are numerous examples of abuse of
lame-duck power to conclude international agreements, even against
the known wishes of the president-elect. Already during the early
republic, lame-duck President Adams ratified the treaty with France,
titled the Treaty of M6rtefontaine, n 3 by relying on lame-duck
senatorial votes. Adams was able to garner the majority by
convincing senators that without the ratification, Thomas Jefferson
would reach a new treaty less favored by them. 114 In more recent
times, President Carter signed in his last day in office the Algiers
Declarations in return for the release of American hostages held in
Iran. This conclusion of the crisis through negotiations rather than
n5
force ran against the declared policy of President-elect Reagan.
President Clinton signed the Rome Statute as a lame duck despite
the controversial nature of the treaty. This act was so unacceptable to
President-elect Bush that he made the unprecedented move of
"unsigning" the treaty. n 6 Most recently, President Bush signed
agreements with the Iraqi government against the wishes of
President-elect Obama. 117 These are just a sample of examples of
abuse of lame-duck power to set facts in the international arena
against the known wishes of the president about to enter office.
Article II, § 2 of the U.S. Constitution requires presidents to
ratify international treaties by receiving the consent of two-thirds of
the Senate, thus requiring the cooperation of two branches of
government in order to undertake international obligations." 8 This

112.
See, e.g., Beermann & Marshall, supra note 8, at 1281 (discussing how
lame-duck presidents usually avoid controversial international issues or seek their
successor's input); Combs, supra note 19, at 334 ("[L]ame-duck administrations have
typically attempted to defer controversial foreign affairs decisions until the new
administration took power, or at the least, have attempted to consult with the
President-elect to attain agreement as to the course to pursue."),
113.
See Nagle, supra note 2, at 322-23 (noting the Senate's ratification of the
Treaty of M6rtefontaine in early February 1801 during the post-election lame-duck
session).
114.
See id., supra note 2, at 322-23. (quoting JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN
MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 252 n.t (1996)) (discussing the negotiations and
agreement at M6rtefontaine).
See Combs, supra note 19, at 306-07 & n.19 (discussing the conflicting
115.
views of Carter and Reagan with regard to the Algiers Declarations).
116.
See Swaine, supra note 18, at 2061-62 (discussing responses to the Bush
Administration's decision to "unsign" the Rome Statute).
See Phair, supra note 16, at 10 (considering the Bush Administration's
117.
constitutional duty during its lame-duck phase).
118.
See U.S. CONST, art. II, § 2(2) ("[The President] shall have Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of
the Senators present concur.").
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bilateral mechanism may reduce the democratic deficit of having a
lame-duck president make commitments in the international arena,
though it does not eradicate the problem because the president may
rely on senatorial consent composed of lame-duck Senate members. 119
U.S. presidents, however, routinely circumvent this constitutional
requirement of receiving two-thirds senatorial approval for
international treaties by treating many international agreements as
"congressional-executive agreements" rather than "international
treaties."'120 The presidents do not seek two-thirds of the Senate's
approval for congressional-executive agreements, but rather treat
such agreements as requiring the consent of both houses in simple
majorities. 12 1 Presidents thus have maneuvering power to decide
what route of ratification is preferable to them: is it easier for them to
garner simple majorities in both houses or a two-thirds majority in
the Senate? The answer may vary according to the factual question of
which political party controls which house. Reaching international
agreements without two-thirds of the Senate's approval during lameduck periods only exacerbates the democratic-legitimacy problem of
having a repudiated president commit the United States to certain
partisan policies in the international arena.
B. Appointments and Actions in the Public Sector
The question of caretaker power has also arisen in Israel in the
context of public-sector appointments. This Article separates the
discussion into three categories: (1) public-sector appointments made
when the government does not occupy a majority in the appointing
body, (2) appointments made when the government has no influence
whatsoever, and (3) appointments made when the government has a
decisive influence. The judicial decisions used the same rhetoric of
Weiss in all three categories and surprisingly arrived at the same
conclusion in each: the Israeli Supreme Court prohibited
appointments during caretaker periods. That is to say, even though
the Weiss decision allowed for peace negotiations during caretaker
administration, the court prohibited public-sector appointments
across the board during caretaker administration. This applies even
when the government has no power to intervene in the appointment.
After discussing Israel's jurisprudence with regard to public-sector

119.
See Weill, supra note 2, at 1122-25, for a discussion with regard to lameduck legislatures.
120.
See generally Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?,
108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995). The authors argue that "We the American People"
expressed dualist consent to the route of congressional-executive agreements and thus
this venue represents a nonofficial amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Id.
121.
Id. at 802-03 (identifying the informal process that yielded the
congressional-executive agreement).
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appointments, this Article discusses comparative treatment of such
appointments.
1.

Public-Sector Appointments When Government Representatives
Do Not Occupy a Majority in the Appointing Body

The Israeli Supreme Court was asked to address the question of
whether a caretaker government is empowered to appoint chief rabbis
and judges. In both cases, the court decided to postpone the
appointments until the formation of a new government, even though
the government's representatives fell short of a majority in the
appointing bodies, as discussed below.
At around the time of Weiss, the National Religious (Mafdal)
Party petitioned, challenging the appointment of chief rabbis and
members of the Chief Rabbinate Council during the term of a
caretaker government. 122 The chief rabbis head both the Great
Rabbinical Court and the Chief Rabbinical Council, which enjoy,
among other powers, state authority in issues of marriage and divorce
of Jewish citizens and inhabitants, kashrut (kosher status) of food,
123
and authorization of rabbis.
Relying on Weiss, the court (with a different composition of
justices) reached a completely different outcome than that reached in
Weiss. It ruled that, because the appointment of chief rabbis was
"final" for a lengthy period of ten years, the decision should wait until
the formation of the new government. 124 The court stated that it was
more important to prevent a caretaker government from appointing
chief rabbis than to uphold the letter of the statute concerning the
election date for chief rabbis. 125 The court also made a distinction
between this case and Weiss, stating: "In the regular course of affairs,
the selection of Rabbis is not reversible; there is something final
about that. This makes the situation different from the circumstances
dealt with in Weiss [where the peace agreement may be made
contingent on Israeli Parliament's approval]. '' 126 Thus, despite the
fact that the government could not manipulate the timing of the
appointment of chief rabbis, which is dictated by law, 12 7 and despite
the fact that government representatives are only a minority on the

122.
HCJ 9577/02 Nat'l Religious Party v. Speaker of the Knesset (HAMAFDAL)
57(1) PD 710 [20021 (Isr.).
123.
See Chief Rabbinate of Israel Law, 5740-1980, SH No. 965 p. 90, § 2 (Isr.)
(listing the functions of the Council of the Chief Rabbinate of Israel).
124.
See HAMVIAFDAL, HCJ 9577/02 (Dorner, J.) (preventing the appointment of
chief rabbis during caretaker administration).
125.
See id. at 715-16.
126.
See id. at 716.
127.
See Chief Rabbinate of Israel Law, 5740-1980, SH No. 965 p. 90, § 16
(stating that chief rabbis serve for ten years and their successors are to begin their
terms at the expiration of their predecessors).
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appointing committee, 128 the court banned the appointment during
caretaker administration.
A similar issue arose during the term of the caretaker
government headed by Prime Minister Olmert. Minister of Justice
Daniel Friedman sought to appoint judges to courts suffering from a
severe shortage of judicial manpower. 129 Ostensibly, this satisfied the
Weiss criteria of "vital public need" for action during caretaker
administration. To this end, the Minister of Justice sought to convene
the Judicial Appointments Committee. 130 By statute, of the nine
members on the Committee, two are ministers and two are Knesset
members. 131 The other members are professionals: three justices (one
of which is the president of the court) and two representatives of the
Israeli Bar Association. 3 2 Significantly, in the wake of a 2008
amendment to the Courts Statute, a majority of seven of the nine
committee members was needed to appoint justices to the Israeli
Supreme Court.133 The professional members of the Committee
therefore have the power to block any appointment that they consider
unworthy.
Despite this composition, the president of the Israeli Supreme
Court, together with two other justices sitting on the Committee,
opposed convening the Committee on the grounds that judges should
134
not be appointed during the term of a caretaker government.
Minister of Justice Friedman criticized President Dorit Beinish's
decision, as she was appointed during a caretaker government's term.
He claimed that her position stemmed from the fact that he and
President Beinish had bitterly disputed judicial policy and the court's
role in a democracy. 135 In other words, Friedman viewed Beinish's
position as politically motivated.

128.

See id. §§ 7-8 (defining the nature and number of representatives in the

appointing committee).
129.
In fact, President Dorit Beinish publicly spoke of the great shortage in
judicial manpower and the urgent need to appoint new judges. See Ruthie Avraham, To
Postpone Appointing Judges Until After Elections, NEWS1 (Oct. 28, 2008),
http://www.newsl.co.il/Archive/001-D-177093-00.html (discussing the president's belief
that although it will lead to further shortages, no judges can be appointed during a
caretaker government).
130.
See 9843/08 HCJ, Legal Forum for the Land of Isr. v. Judicial Election
Comm., 4 (Jan. 8, 2009), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
131.
See Basic Law: The Judiciary, 5744-1984, SH No. 110 p. 78, § 4 (Isr.)
(listing the composition of the Judicial Appointments Committee).
132.
See id.
133.
See Courts Law, 5769-2008, SH No. 2176 p. 813 (Isr.) (Revision No. 55).
134.
See Legal Forum, HCJ 9843/08,
1.
135.
He favored judicial restraint and interpreted her position as favoring
judicial activism. On the great controversy between President Beinish and Minister of
Justice Friedman, see Yuval Yoaz, Friedman's Purpose: To Limit the High Court of
Justice's Spheres of Intervention, HAARETZ (Aug. 23, 2007), http://www.haaretz.co.il/
misc/1.1559086.
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The court, sitting as a High Court of Justice, dismissed a petition
challenging the Committee's decision not to convene during caretaker
period. 136 The court explained that the Committee's decision was not
"unreasonable. ' 137 Although the court accepted that there was a "vital
public need" for appointment, it refrained from intervening because
"the appointment of new judges is a subject at the center of public
138
political controversy."'
The decisions regarding the appointment of both chief rabbis and
judges show that the court treats caretaker governments as different
from regular ones. It strives to inhibit their actions to appoint
important public figures that exercise discretionary powers over
Israel's public life, so that these appointments will be conducted by a
government with a fresh mandate from the people.
2.

Appointments in Which the Government Has No Influence

The court's efforts to prevent public-sector appointments during
a caretaker period are so far-reaching that this principle was also
applied to cases in which the government had no influence on the
appointment. For example, the National Labor Court entertained the
question of whether a director of Arabic-language television
broadcasts could be appointed during the term of the caretaker
government headed by Prime Minister Olmert. 139 As with other
professional civil-service appointments, a tender is issued for the
appointment of a director for Arabic broadcasts; the government does
not make the appointment.140 If the tender fails to produce suitable
candidates, a search committee makes the appointment.'41 In this
case, the conflict of interest that arose in the search committee
proceedings was not the reason why the Labor Court disqualified the
appointment. Rather, it was because the appointment was set to
occur during the term of a caretaker government, notwithstanding
the fact that the government was not empowered to make the
appointment or to intervene in the appointment process, and no
evidence of influence or an attempt to influence the appointment was
produced. 142 This decision of the National Labor Court demonstrates
that courts have understood the Israeli Supreme Court's policy to

136.
See Legal Forum, HCJ 9843/08, 15.
137,
See id. 11.
138.
See id.
12-13.
139.
See AA 672/08 Israel's Broad. Auth. v. Tavor (Jan. 27, 2009), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
140.
See id. at 6.
141.
See id.
142.
But see HCJ 10134/02 MK Aushayia v. Prime Minister 57(2) PD 49, 53
[2003] (Isr.) (reaching the opposite result and allowing the appointment, during an
election period, of the directors of the First Channel of the Israeli Broadcasting
Authority and of the television news division).
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require refraining from making appointments in the public sector
during caretaker administration.
3.

Appointments in Which the Government Has Decisive Influence

The court prohibited the appointment of religious council
members during caretaker periods based on the government's
decisive control of the appointment process. The court expressed
great concern that the government's considerations in making its
appointments would be improper, or would at least be viewed that
way by the public. 143 It seems that the court attached importance to
leaving the appointment to a government representing the public's
most up-to-date opinion. Thus, an appointment in which the
government exercises a decisive influence is best left to the incoming
144
government whenever possible.
The message emerging from decisions regarding appointments in
the public sector is clear: public-sector appointments should not be
made during a caretaker government's term of office. Judges, 145 chief
rabbis, 14 6 members of religious councils, 147 a director of Arabic
television14 8-and by extension, important officials in the judicial
branch of government, civil service, and local authorities-are among
the prohibited categories. The reasons may vary: to make sure the
choice reflects the public's up-to-date opinion, or to prevent the
appearance that the appointment is motivated by improper
considerations, especially if the choice would be final or irreversible.
The court adheres so strongly to this idea that it applies it even when
the government plays no role in an appointment or is only a minority

143.
See HCJ 8815/05 Adv. Landstein v. Adv. Spiegler (Dec. 26, 2005), Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
144.
See also HCJ 4065/09 Adv. Cohen v. Minister of Interior (July 20, 2010),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.); cf. HCJ 5240/96 Juamis v. Minister of
Interior 51(1) PD 289, 300 [19971 (Isr.). Significant restrictions on the acts of a
caretaker government in the public arena were also expressed in a petition concerning
the consolidation of local authorities in Judea and Samaria, even though fundamental
decisions had been made before the government became a caretaker. See HCJ 10466/08
Alchaini v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria (Jan. 1, 2009), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
145.
See sutpra Part III.B.1 (discussing the judicial prohibition of caretaker
governments from appointing judges).
146.
See sttpra Part III.B.1 (discussing the judicial prohibition of caretaker
governments from appointing chief rabbis).
147.
See supra Part III.B.3 (explaining the prohibition of religious-counsel
appointments as a matter of governmental control and public opinion of that control).
148.
See supra Part III.B.2 (demonstrating the coverage of appointment
prohibitions by looking at officials who are not appointed by government officials, but
cannot be appointed during the term of a caretaker government).
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on the appointing body. 14 9 In the last two cases, the legislature
ostensibly expressed its opinion that the appointment was not
political. Nevertheless, the judicial branch took a different approach.
This total ban on public-sector appointments may lead to a paralysis
of state affairs.
The judicial message regarding public-sector appointments is
also the reverse of the message in the peace negotiations context. The
court expresses its views that caretaker governments are different
creatures than regular governments: one should be wary both of their
democratic legitimacy and extraneous motives, and thus curtail their
actions.
4.

Comparative Experience with Public-Sector Appointments

Israeli administrations are not alone in attempting to complete
public sector appointments during caretaker periods. In fact, U.S.
political history is full of lame-duck appointments as well. However,
while Israeli courts prohibit and rescind such caretaker
appointments, there is no one to effectively guard against such
appointments in the United States.
Lame-duck appointments were already occurring in the United
States in the early days of the republic. The most famous U.S.
constitutional decision, Marbury v. Madison, established the power of
judicial review over statutes. 150 Less known is the fact that the
landmark decision dealt with the outrageous sweeping judicial
appointments John Adams made while he was a lame-duck
president. 151 Adams intended to pack the judiciary with judges who
were affiliated with or identified with the Federalists in the face of
the already known Republican electoral takeover of both the
presidency and Congress. 1 52 To this effect, Adams also passed the
Judiciary Act, which enjoyed the partisan support of Federalist votes,
and created many new judicial positions that he hurried to occupy
with his appointees. 153 In addition, Adams also appointed many
members to the executive branch, filling military, diplomatic, and
15 4
sundry positions.

149.
See supra Part III.B.1-2 (offering examples of instances in which the
government had little or no influence in the appointment process, yet caretaker
government appointments were still prohibited).
150.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-80 (1803) (declaring
that laws in conflict with the Constitution are void and the judiciary has the authority
to judge which laws are in conflict with the Constitution).
151.
See Nagle, supra note 2, at 317-22 (examining the actions John Adams took
as a lame-duck president).
152.
See id. at 318-21 (detailing the actions taken by Adams during his lameduck period).
153.
Id. at 324-25.
154.
Id. at 325-26.
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President Thomas Jefferson, who followed Adams, treated these
last minute appointments as illegitimate and attempted to undo them
through various drastic measures. These methods included refusing
to deliver the signed commissions to the prospective appointees,
repealing the Judiciary Act, impeaching specific members of the
judiciary, and abolishing the 1802 Supreme Court term. 1 55 Among his
last-minute appointments to the judicial branch, President Adams
appointed William Marbury as a justice of the peace in the last fortyeight hours of his administration. 1 56 Alas, his Secretary of State,
John Marshall, failed to deliver the signed commission to Marbury
before the end of Adams's term. 15 7 Jefferson refused to deliver the
commission, and Marbury petitioned the Court to honor the
commission appointing him a justice of the peace. 158 Though John
Marshall-former Secretary of State and appointed Chief Justice by
the lame-duck Adams-declared that Marbury was entitled to the
commission, Marbury lost the case because the Court decided that it
159
was not authorized to grant him the relief sought.
These lame-duck appointments to the public sector did not end in
the first decades of the republic. Rather, a lame-duck administration
typically promotes its people into key positions in the civil service to
entrench its policies after it no longer governs. On average, over one
hundred employees are transferred from political to tenured positions
in U.S. administrations during lame-duck periods. 160 The lame-duck
president may also fill vacancies or, conversely, eliminate positions,
depending on his or her substantive attitude toward a specific
administrative agency and its programs. 161 As a result, the incoming
president may find it even more difficult to control the supposedly
"professional" merit-based civil service and to encourage it to promote
162
the new presidential agenda.

155.
156.

Combs, supra note 19, at 303-05.
Nagle, supranote 2, at 326.

157.

Id.

158.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 143 (1803) (describing the
failure of the Jefferson Administration to deliver the commission).
159.
See id. at 138 ("The supreme court of the U. States has not power to issue a
mandamus to a secretary of state of the U. States, it being an exercise of original
jurisdiction not warranted by the constitution."); see also Nagle, supra note 2, at 32628 (describing the circumstances of the Marbury case).
160.
Mendelson, Agency Burrowing, supra note 8, at 606.
161.
See id. at 607 (describing how the administration of George H.W. Bush
"eliminate[d] a 141-person office of the Army Corps of Engineers in Buffalo three days
after the election").
162.
See id. at 615 (noting that a new administration will have to guard against
subversion of its policies by appointees of the previous administration). Mendelson
argues that there are also benefits to be considered: such last-minute hiring decisions
by the lame-duck administration may contribute to diversity within the bureaucracy,
enhance deliberation and dialogue within the bureaucracy and also between it and the
public on the one hand, and the Presidency on the other, and even enable self-
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It should be noted that last-minute appointments to the public
sector are not cut of one cloth. Rather, the President must gain the
Senate's confirmation for some of these appointments, including
Justices of the Supreme Court. 163 Supposedly, this interbranch
cooperation strengthens the legitimacy of lame-duck appointments.
This assertion must be qualified, however, since those lame-duck
appointments usually fail if the Senate is controlled by a different
political party, rather than that associated with the lame-duck
president. A Senate controlled by a different political party prefers to
leave the vacancies for their president-elect to fill. 1 64 Thus, lame-duck

appointments that do gain the Senate's approval may be of two types.
The first presents a partisan move of the lame-duck president that
succeeds solely because of partisan support of his or her party in the
Senate. This type of lame-duck appointment should hardly be viewed
as legitimate, despite the interbranch confirmation process. The other
type is an appointment that succeeds because it involves a moderate
candidate, perhaps even one identified with the political party that is
about to gain the presidency. The lame-duck president promotes this
appointment as the "lesser evil," that is to say, better to influence the
identity of the candidate to be appointed from the rival camp than
have no say at all in the appointment process. The latter will occur if
the vacancy is left for the president-elect to fill. Those appointments
may be treated as bipartisan and garner support from senators of
both political parties. 16 5 This bipartisan type of lame-duck
appointment may be viewed as relatively more legitimate because it
represents a consensual move rather than an assertion of power that
should no longer belong to the lame-duck president.
In contrast to the United States, parliamentary systems,
especially those that originally belonged to the Commonwealth, follow
conventions under which caretaker administrations refrain from
making significant public-sector appointments. 16 6 These conventions
require leaving those appointments for the new incoming government
to decide. 167 If there is a vacancy that must be filled, the caretaker
government may only make a temporary appointment-including

monitoring within the bureaucracy because of the diversity of opinions and personnel.
Id. at 642, 648.
163.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring advice and consent of the
Senate for the appointment of certain officials).
164.
Keith E. Whittington, Presidents, Senates, and Failed Supreme Court
Nominations,2006 SUP. CT. REV. 401, 416 (2007).
165.
Id. at 417 (describing Republican Benjamin Harrison's appointment of a
Democrat to the Supreme Court during the lame-duck session of 1892); see also John
Massaro, "Lame-Duck" Presidents,Great Justices?, 8 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 296, 299
(1978) (arguing that lame-duck presidents tend to deemphasize ideology and other
political factors in choosing nominees to the Supreme Court).
See supra Part I.D.
166.
See supra Part IID.
167.
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extending the stay of a presiding official-for a few months, so as not
to bind the hands of its successor. 168 If a temporary appointment is
not possible, or if it is not desirable in light of the public interest, then
the caretaker government must gain the consent of either the
16 9
incoming government or the legislature for the appointment.
Obtaining such consent makes the appointment legitimate and
consensual rather than partisan. Which governmental branch's
170
cooperation is required differs between various countries.
C. Distributionof Material Goods to the Public
1.

Distribution of Material Goods to the Public

The decision concerning the authority of the Committee for the
National List of Reimbursed Drugs (NLRD) to convene on the eve of
Knesset elections dealt with the distribution of material goods by a
caretaker government. 171 At first glance, the decision is mystifying.
The NLRD Committee was banned from convening before the
elections but was permitted to convene immediately after the
elections, even before a new government was formed. 1 72 It was
further emphasized in the Israeli Supreme Court's decision that, after
the elections, the caretaker government was permitted to decide to
173
adopt recommendations of the Committee to expand the NLRD.
How can the court's decision be explained? If the ban on
convening the NLRD Committee was based on the government's
status as caretaker, this status would not have changed after the
elections until a new government was formed. It would have been
expected that a caretaker government's actions banned before
elections would be even more verboten after elections. 174 In the words
of President Barak in Weiss, the range of reasonableness in which a
caretaker government is entitled to act "becomes narrower-and the

168.
See, e.g., Boston et al., supra note 3, at 638 (discussing lame-duck policies
in New Zealand); Roy, supra note 5, at 97-98, 101 (discussing lame-duck policies in
India).
169.
See, e.g., Boston et al., supra note 3, at 637 (explaining that in New
Zealand's parliamentary system, emergency interim measures should not be made
without consultation with the opposition).
170.
For example, New Zealand's Cabinet Manual requires the consent of the
House. See NEW ZEALAND CABINET MANUAL, supra note 51, § 6.20(d). But if the
identity of the next government is clear, then its consent must be sought. Id. § 6.24.
171.
HCJ 2453/06 Israel's Med. Ass'n v. Attorney Gen. (IMA) (Mar. 21, 2006),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
172.
Id.
3-4 (Grunis, J.).
173.
Id.
3-4 (Grunis, J.), 3 (Naor, J.).
174.
This argument applies even if the election's results show that the ruling
party has not lost its power. This is so because-in a parliamentary system with
proportional representation, there is a need to build a coalition, and the resulting
government may have a different agenda than the preceding one. See supra Part II.A.
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need for restraint and reserve made more necessary-after the
elections, and before the elected prime minister begins his term in
office.' 175 But the NLRD judicial decision allows a caretaker
government to perform functions after elections that it is not allowed
to perform prior to elections.
Although this was not explicitly stated by the court, this Article
suggests that the rationale underlying the NLRD decision was the
concern that, if the NLRD Committee and, in turn, the government
decided to expand the NLRD before elections, this would have
constituted a form of "bribery" and an attempt to distribute material
goods in the form of drugs in order to gain electorate support for the
existing government. 176 Justice Miriam Naor might have been
insinuating this when writing that: "The real conflict is that the
government decision, which the petitioners are aiming for, will be
rendered before the elections and under the pressure of elections,
thereby increasing the chances that the government will accept the
NLRD committee's expected recommendation."'1 7 7 Since this involved
a risk of distribution of material goods as a means of influencing the
election's results, the court saw fit to bar the expansion of the NLRD
before the elections, but permitted it after the elections when there
was no cause for concern that the decision could constitute a form of
election bribery. Obviously, the distribution of drugs after elections
cannot change election's results that have already been decided.
The decision to expand the NLRD-as opposed to the timing of
the expansion-did not call for caretaker restraint in the court's view,
178
since there was a "vital public need" for taking action to save lives.
Moreover, this Article suggests that the decision to expand the NLRD
did not deviate from the country's regular course of business.
Consequently, this action was not significant enough to warrant
postponing the action for a new government.
Another example of this category of material goods may be found
in the court's decision regarding the timing of submission of
investigative committees' reports. Regional Municipality of Modiin v.
Minister of Interior dealt with the question of when investigative
committees should submit their reports to the Ministry of the
Interior. 179 Because the reports implied change in the boundaries
between local authorities and had potential implications for the

175.
HCJ 5167/00 Weiss v. Prime Minister of Isr. 55(2) PD 455, 470 [2001].
176.
The NLRD Committee is appointed by the Ministers of Health and
Treasury. It advises the government and the Health Council on which drugs should be
included in the government's healthcare package. IMA, HCJ 2453/06, 2 (Grunis, J.).
177.
Id. 4 (Naor, J.).
178.
Id.
3-4 (Grunis, J.). See also Justice Levi's dissenting opinion that
because of the urgency of the matter, the NLRD should convene even before elections.
HCJ 6413/08 Reg'l Municipality of Modi'in v. Minister of Interior (March
179.
10, 2010), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
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distribution of income among municipalities, they could have affected
the regional elections. 80 Probably for this reason, the court decided
that "[t]he committee's recommendations shall not be submitted until
after the elections for the local authorities."''
Because the court distinguished between pre- and post-election
distribution of goods, this Article suggests that if the court believed
the government intended to distribute material goods on the eve of
elections as a means of indirectly influencing the election's results,
the court would prohibit the action before the elections but allow it
afterwards, even before the formation of a new government. In
principle, this could be within the government's regular sphere of
authority; thus, if not for the timing. on the eve of elections, it would
not have been problematic even for a caretaker government.
2.

Comparing Distribution of Material Goods and Public-Sector
Appointments

But why is the distribution of material goods different from
public-sector appointments? On its face, both constitute distribution
of goods on the eve of elections. Yet, the court applies a different law
to the two categories. 8 2 Public appointments must wait until a new
government is formed.' 8 3 In contrast, the government may not
distribute material goods pre-elections, but can do so post-elections
84
and even before a new government is formed.1
This Article suggests that the divergent treatment can be
explained by examining the beneficiaries and consequences of each
act: a public appointment benefits the appointee; for him or her, it
resembles the distribution of goods. Yet the consequences to the
public are continuous throughout the appointment period and extend
well beyond election time. Thus, the appointment is arguably a way
to continue influencing, setting, and even entrenching the
government's agenda after the government's caretaker period ends. A
public appointment should therefore not be regarded as purely a
matter of political hygiene, but should be avoided until a new
government is formed.
The distribution of actual material goods, on the other hand,
benefits members of the public who receive the good and certainly can
influence elections if done near elections. But its effects are usually
short-lived; research indicates that people are more affected in their
immediate decisions by short- rather than long-term considerations,

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 3.
Id.
See supra Part II.B, 111.C.1.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.C.1.
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and thus distribution done years in advance of the next election will
probably not influence people's votes.18 5 It makes sense, therefore,
that the government may distribute material goods to the public as
long as it is done after the elections, whether or not a new
government has formed.
3.

Comparative Experience with Distribution of Material Goods to
the Public

Not only do Israeli governments distribute material goods to the
public during transition times, but U.S. presidents, too, utilize their
power during the end of their presidency to distribute favors and
goods to individuals, interest groups, and the public at large. In
addition to the exercise of the appointment power already discussed,
which often requires the Senate's cooperation, presidents utilize their
unilateral pardon power in favor of contested cases.1 8 6 The pardon
and appointment powers benefit specific individuals.
Presidents also unilaterally declare vast parcels of land as
national monuments and parks.' 8 7 This may already serve as a
"bribery" technique to affect the election's results. Indeed, President
Clinton turned many acres into nature reserves in order to assist Al
Gore in his election campaign.' 8 8 It should be noted, however, that it
is more common for presidents to exploit their unilateral power in the
ways mentioned after elections rather than before. Two explanations
may be offered for this post-election behavior. First, when this
behavior is manifested after elections, it is generally intended to
affect presidents' "legacy" rather than influence election results
already decided.18 9 Second, presidents utilize these unilateral powers

185.
See, e.g., Michael M. Bechtel & Jens Hainmueller, How Lasting Is Voter
Gratitude? An Analysis of the Short- and Long-Term Electoral Returns to Beneficial
Policy, 55 Am.J. POL. SCI. 851, 864-65 (2011) (considering the duration of the beneficial
impact of public goods on voter decision making).
186.
The Constitution of the United States grants unilateral pardon power to
the President. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. On the use of the pardon power in
controversial ways during lame-duck presidencies, consider Howell & Mayer, supra
note 40, at 533-35. See also Beermann, supra note 8, at 977-80 (reviewing
controversial pardons granted by President Clinton in the waning days of his term).
187.
Howell & Mayer, supra note 40, at 546-47 (discussing President Clinton's
establishment of numerous national monuments). See generally Margaret Tseng, Lame
Duck Presidents and the Use of Unilateral Powers: An Examination of Monument
Proclamations (presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, Aug. 27-31, 2003), available at http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/pmla-aparesearchcitationO/6/4/7/6/pages64764p64764-1.php.
188.
Beermann, supra note 8, at 975-76 (considering the potential electoral
effects of President Clinton's efforts to convert land into nature reserves prior to
elections).
For a discussion of legacy concerns as influential on presidential lame-duck
189.
policies, see, e.g., David A. Crockett, "An Excess of Refinement" Lame Duck Presidents
in Constitutional and Historical Context, 38 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 707, 711-15
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more after elections when they fear influencing the ballot in
unwanted ways if actions are pursued before elections. If their
behavior carries the risk of being unpopular, they will wait until after
elections to execute their plans. 190
These last-minute actions are typical to U.S. lame-duck
presidents but not to caretaker governments in parliamentary
systems. 191 This divergence can be attributed not only to the
existence of effective caretaker conventions in parliamentary
systems, 192 but also to the fact that, in parliamentary systems, prime
ministers typically do not enjoy unilateral powers equivalent to those
enjoyed by U.S. presidents. 193 Furthermore, this lame-duck concern
about presidential legacy is more characteristic of the "cult of
personality"
that
accompanies
presidential
rather
than
194
parliamentary systems.
This Article concludes by stating that the Israeli Supreme Court
stepped into the vacuum caused by the lack of constitutional
conventions regarding Israeli caretaker governments. The court will
not hesitate to restrict caretaker actions if it believes that the actions
should be postponed until a new government is formed, as is the case
with public-sector appointments. 195 In this respect, the court
functions as a restraining power on Israeli caretaker governments,
much like constitutional conventions in other parliamentary
systems. 196 But no similar restraining power inhibits U.S. lame-duck
presidents. This perspective only makes the Israeli Supreme Court's
position on peace negotiations more puzzling. Why does the court
permit caretaker governments to negotiate for peace but ban them
from making public-sector appointments? Shouldn't one be worried

(2008); Tseng, supra note 187, at 6 ("The lack of political consequence in the final year
gives additional incentive for presidents to extend their policy impact and political
legacy.").
190.
Jeffery A. Jenkins & Timothy P. Nokken, Contemporary Lame-Duck
Sessions of Congress: An Overview and Assessment with Special Emphasis on the
110th Congress 6 (unpublished working paper), available at http://faculty.virginia.edu
jajenkins/contempLD.pdf (analyzing the timing considerations of presidents in their
use of their unilateral powers).
191.
See Parts I, II.D.
192.
See, e.g., UK CABINET MANUAL, supra note 51,
2.27-34 (discussing
restrictions on government activity following, for instance, the loss of a vote of
confidence). A caretaker government is "expected not to take any important policy
decision that goes to influence the popular vote in its favour or adversely affects the
prospects of the opposition leaders in the battle of the ballot box." JOHAFI, supra note 1,
at 139. But see Roy, supra note 5, at 100 (describing Charan Singh's attempts at "vote
garnering exercises").
193.
Ackerman, supra note 10, at 647-56 (comparing the power of prime
ministers in parliamentary systems with the power of U.S. presidents).
194.
Id. at 657-64 (discussing the "cult of personality" prevalent in the U.S.
presidential system when compared to a parliamentary system of the British type).
195.
See supra Part III.B.
196.
See supra Parts I, II.D.
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about democratic legitimacy or extraneous considerations when
caretaker governments negotiate for peace? Or does the court's
position show that regulating caretaker action has or should have
limitations bounded by the political question doctrine? In the next
Part, this Article proposes and critiques a number of possible
explanations for the court's divergent treatment of peace
negotiations, on the one hand, and public-sector appointments, on the
other.

IV. WHY DISTINGUISH PEACE NEGOTIATIONS FROM
PUBLIC-SECTOR APPOINTMENTS?

From the Israeli judicial decisions described above, several
rationales may be derived that justify the divergent judicial
treatment of public-sector appointments and peace negotiations
during caretaker periods. These rationales include: (1) the act's
reversibility; (2) the importance of representing the people's most
current opinion when making the act; and (3) the justiciability of the
issue, including the existence of alternative control mechanisms to
the court's intervention. This Part argues that these rationales do not
support the contradictory outcome wherein a caretaker government
may conduct peace negotiations but may not appoint public-sector
officials. Thus, the divergent Israeli judicial treatment amounts to
inconsistency. The next Part argues that Israel's experience with
judicial review over transitional governments does not prove that this
matter should be treated as nonjusticiable. Rather, this Article
discusses how a properly designed law applied to transitional
governments may lead to better, more consistent results in judicial
decisions.
A. Reversibility
The Israeli Supreme Court differentiated between peace
negotiations and public-sector appointments, explaining, inter alia,
that appointments are not reversible, while peace treaties are, since
19 7
the latter can be made conditional upon legislative ratification.
Does this distinction legitimize peace negotiations by a caretaker
government?

See HCJ 9577/02 Nat'l Religious Party v. Speaker of the Knesset
197.
(HAMAFDAL) 57(1) PD 710, 716 [2002] (Isr.) (justifying the court's decision to reject
public-sector appointments while allowing peace negotiations during caretaker period).
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Distinguishing Signing from Ratification

In allowing caretaker governments to negotiate for peace, the
Israeli Supreme Court in effect relied upon the distinction prevailing
in contemporary international law between the stages of signing and
ratifying international agreements. While in the past it was enough
to sign a treaty, the presumption today is that all treaties must be
ratified before they become binding by international law. 198 The law
changed largely due to the development of democracy and the
principle of separation of powers. Historically, the negotiators were
the representatives of the Crown, carrying out its orders, and
international law did not anticipate a discrepancy between the
positions of the ruler and the treaty signatories. 199 In modern times,
with the separation of powers, it became apparent that the executive
conducting international negotiations might not represent the
opinions of the legislature. 200 Therefore, the gap between signing and
ratification serves the need for efficient negotiations subject to the
veto power of the legislature, as required by the constitutions of many
201
countries.
It should be noted that oftentimes the treaty is both signed and
ratified by the executive for purposes of international law, even when
the internal law of the country requires its ratification by the
legislature. 20 2 In the latter case, however, before the treaty is ratified
by the executive for international law purposes, the executive
requests the consent of the legislature as prescribed in the internal
203
law.
2.

The Significance of Signing

Does this legal focus on ratification imply that the signing stage
is of little consequence? Theoretically, international undertakings

198.
See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the
U.S. Constitution, 48 HARv. INT'L L.J. 307, 313 (2007) (noting that under modern
practice, signature alone is insufficient to manifest consent to be bound by a treaty).
199.
Id. at 313-14 (emphasizing that monarchs "had the authority to
unilaterally bind their nations to treaties").
200.
See, e.g., John Eugene Harley, The Obligation To Ratify Treaties, 13 AM. J.
INT'L L. 389, 392-93 (1919) (considering the legislature's obligation to ratify a treaty,
and the possibility that the legislature will refuse to do so, once the executive has
signed it).
201.
See id.; see also Bradley, supra note 198, at 308 (discussing the tension in
the United States between unilateral executive treaty powers and the Senate's
constitutional veto power).
202.
See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 198, at 308 (discussing how unilateral
executive action is in conflict with Article 1I of the Constitution, which requires "the
advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate").
203.
See, e.g., CrimA 131/67 Kamiar v. State of Isr., 22(2) PD 85, 120-23 [19681
(Isr.).
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could be shirked by nonratification. Indeed, many countries have not
ratified the agreements they signed. 20 4 Nonetheless, this Article
argues that it would be wrong to diminish the importance of signing
international agreements for several reasons. First, the distinction
between the two stages, signing and ratification, primarily applies to
multilateral treaties, in which a country is only one of many
players. 20 5 It thus has less bargaining power, especially if it is not an
influential state, and it must go home with the proposed draft of the
agreement and obtain the approval of the relevant internal
institutions, primarily the legislature.
The distinction between the stages in bilateral treaties is more
problematic. If the country is dissatisfied with the treaty, it has the
prerogative to refuse to become a party to it from the outset.
206
International law recognizes the duty of good faith as a core duty,
which means that a country should not sign a treaty when the
executive knows that it does not have legislative support to ratify it.
Second, the signing stage per se creates an interim obligation
under international law. In accordance with the Vienna Convention,
which enjoys the status of customary international law, at the stage
between the signing and ratifying, "[a] State is obliged to refrain from
acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty. '20 7 This
obligation is established only at the interim stage and can be
stipulated otherwise in the treaty itself.208 Moreover, this obligation
becomes void if the state indicates that it does not intend to ratify the
209
treaty.
Yet, the very interim obligation gives legal effect to the act of
signing an international agreement. In order to avoid these interim
obligations, George W. Bush used the unprecedented tactic of
"unsigning" the Rome Statute. 210 Interestingly, President Clinton
211
was criticized for signing the Rome Statute as a lame duck.
Third, the final draft of the agreement is usually formulated at
the signing stage. After that, ratification is mostly a binary all-or-

See, e.g., Swaine, supra note 18, at 2064 (discussing a phenomenon common
204.
in the United States and elsewhere whereby the executive signs a treaty or other
international agreement that is never subsequently ratified by the legislature).
205.
Id. at 2088; see also Joanna Harrington, Redressing the DemocraticDeficit
in Treaty Law Making: (Re-)Establishinga Role for Parliament, 50 MCGILL L.J. 465,
472 (2005) (stating that with bilateral treaties, the tasks of signing and ratification are
done in a single procedure, whereas with multilateral treaties, there is a clearer
distinction between the two processes).
Vienna Convention, supra note 18, pmbl. (noting that the principle of good
206.
faith is universally recognized).
Id. art. 18.
207.
Id. art. 18, 19.
208.
Id. art. 18(a).
209.
Swaine, supra note 18, at 2061.
210.
211.
Id. at 2085-86 (suggesting that President Clinton's "hasty signature"
during his lame-duck period indicated "shallow engagement").
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212
nothing decision, particularly in the case of bilateral agreements.
Of course, if the government knows that it needs legislative approval
to ratify a treaty, the legislature's position will have already
influenced the content of the agreement. 213 This assumption,
however, is problematic in light of the considerations presented
below.
Fourth, a decision by the legislature to not ratify an
international treaty, which was signed by the government, may
damage the state's international reputation and its ability to conduct
negotiations in the future, especially bilateral agreements. Therefore,
the legislature sometimes approves an international agreement that
214
it would otherwise not have agreed to.
Fifth, the damage to a state's international reputation stemming
from a decision not to ratify may be detrimental to its relations with
the other contracting state(s). In extreme cases, failure to ratify
might also lead to formal or informal sanctions by the international
community. This situation is especially relevant when the signatory
is a small country and the agreement has major implications for other
215
states.
It is no coincidence that noted writers on the powers of
transitional governments caution that these governments must
exercise restraint, especially when conducting foreign affairs. 216 In
particular, governments must act in cooperation with the legislature
in this sensitive area, which calls for stability and continuity. The

212.
Under the Vienna Convention, a state may only enter a reservation upon
signing the treaty. Vienna Convention, supra note 18, art. 19. Such reservations are
possible if they are not explicitly forbidden in the treaty itself, and if the reservation
does not preempt and void the intent and purpose of the treaty. Id. The Convention
further states that with treaties dealing with a small number of signatories in which it
is evident that the purpose and design of the treaty is meant for it to apply fully to all
the signatories, the concession of the additional signatories may be required in order
for a state to enter a reservation. Id. art. 20.2.
213.
See LISA L. MARTIN, DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENTS: LEGISLATURES AND
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 53-80 (2000) (providing an empirical analysis of U.S.
treaties and executive agreements, finding that the legislature influences international
cooperation in numerous ways).
214.
For a discussion about the complex dynamics between the legislative and
executive branches in the formation of international treaties, see id. at 3-80 (analyzing
legislative influence).
215.
See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-BasedTheory of International
Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1863-64 (2002) (discussing the reputational harm that can
come even to large countries when their legal foreign policy actions have adverse
implications for other states).
216.
See, e.g., Combs, supra note 19, at 334-35 (discussing the limitations that
lame-duck status should have upon a president's power to conduct foreign affairs);
Nagle, supra note 2, at 340 (proposing that lame-duck actors should be denied the
power to take irrevocable actions); Phair, supra note 16, at 2-5 (outlining the
constitutional constraints that ought to apply with regard to a lame-duck president).
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is dictated to a large
ability of a country to advance its interests
2 17
degree by its reputation for reliability.
This position is also supported by the fact that there is an
inherent tension between international law and the basic tenets of
democracy. While democracy usually enables the majority to change
its statutes (subject to its constitution), under international law a
contracting party may not unilaterally retreat from its obligations,
218
even if there has been a change of government in its country.
Therefore, great care must be taken to ensure that the caretaker
government does not overstep its authority, particularly in the realm
of foreign, as opposed to internal, affairs. While a new government
has many tools to overturn recent decisions in the realm of internal
affairs, they are less available when it comes to the conduct of foreign
219
affairs.
Thus, the Israeli Supreme Court's distinction-between publicsector appointments, which it treats as final, and international
agreements, which it treats as provisional because they may be
subject to the legislature's approval-is not convincing. All of these
arguments support a decision by the Israeli Supreme Court to
restrain caretaker governments from engaging in international
negotiations. This Article now examine whether the Israeli peace
process may suggest a different conclusion.
3.

The Israeli Peace Process

In the context of an Israeli peace treaty, how would these
considerations be expressed? Had the peace treaty discussed in Weiss
been signed, it would have been difficult for the Knesset to extricate
itself from the bilateral agreement, both for fear of damaging its
reputation and because of the possibility of international sanctions.
"Unsigning" the treaty would likely have further eroded its relations
with the Palestinian Authority. It is therefore questionable that
making the ratification of the agreement subject to its approval by
the Knesset would have been enough to overcome the legitimacy
problem of having a caretaker government that did not enjoy the
confidence of the Knesset negotiate and sign the peace agreement.

See Beermann & Marshall, supra note 8, at 1281-82 (examining the impact
217.
that reliability plays in the ability of the United States to conduct foreign policy).
218.
See Combs, supra note 19, at 329-40 (discussing the fact that subsequent
administrations must abide by obligations made by prior administrations or the
country will be in breach of international law).
219.
See id. ("[Ilncoming Presidents, at least in theory, do not have the range of
responses [available in domestic policy] ... to limit or eliminate their predecessor's
foreign affairs' commitments.").
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Moreover, the reality of peace talks in the Middle East is such
that negotiations often begin where previous talks ended. 220 Thus, for
instance, Attorney General Elyakim Rubinstein warned Prime
Minister Barak's government in early 2001 that it was inappropriate
to conduct negotiations during a transition period. 22 1 According to
him, Israel's experience in reaching tentative understandings in
negotiations is that 'an understanding once reached cannot be taken
back', meaning it is very difficult to go back on something perceived
as a concession in the negotiations. ' 222 It should be emphasized that
the warning was given regarding the very same peace negotiations
that were at issue in Weiss. Similarly, more recently, President
Obama made it clear to Prime Minister Netanyahu that "[w]e won't
start the negotiations from scratch, we will not take the historical
record and toss it aside."2 23 According to the same source, "There's an
historical record of all past negotiations. '224 It is therefore important
that Israel's negotiators have a mandate from the electorate to
negotiate.
Furthermore, under Israel's law, once the Israeli Government
has ratified a treaty, it becomes binding upon the State of Israel
225
under international law, even if the Knesset opposes the treaty.
Israel has also stated this policy in a written declaration to the
United Nations:
(A) [Tihe legal power to negotiate, sign and ratify international treaties
on behalf of Israel is vested exclusively in the government of Israel and
is in the charge of the Minister for Foreign Affairs; (B) where the
Knesset has given its approval to the ratification of the treaty, the act
226
of ratification is signed by the President of the State.

The language of Basic Law: The President of the State provides
that the President "shall sign such treaties with foreign states that
have been ratified by the Knesset. ' 227 However, the government and

220.

See ITAMAR RABINOVICH, WAGING PEACE: ISRAEL AND THE ARABS 1948-

2003, at 152 (2004) (providing that the Israelis and the Palestinians both knew that,
once a concession was made or an idea was placed on the table, it could not be undone,
even if they were "formally" withdrawn from the table).
221.
Press Announcement: Elyakim Rubinstein Does Not Recognize Right of
Government To Conduct Critical Negotiations with Palestinians, NEWS1 (Jan. 1, 2001),
www.newsl.co.il/Archive/0019-D-60-0o.html?tag=12-49-54.
222.
Id.
223.
Natasha Mozgobyea & Barak Rabid, Obama Strongly Expressed His
Impatience to Netanyahu and Abbas, HAARETZ (Sep. 23, 2009, 1:52 AM),
http://www.haaretz.comlprint-edition/news/source-obama-strongly-expressed-hisimpatience-to-netanyahu-and-abbas- 1.7435.
224.
Id.
225.
CA 131/67 Kamiar v. State of Isr. 22(2) PD 85, 97 [1968] (Isr.); see
RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 33, at 914-24.
226.
See Kamiar22(2) PD at 104.
227.
Basic Law: The President of the State, 5724, SH No. 428 p. 118, § 11(5)
(Isr.).
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ensuing judicial decisions interpreted this provision as requiring the
President to sign the treaty only when the government requested the
Knesset's approval and such legislative approval was de facto
granted. 228 The provision was not interpreted to require the consent
of the Knesset as a precondition for ratifying treaties. This is the
representation that Israel made to other states with which it was
229
conducting negotiations.
Therefore, changing the law concerning negotiations with the
Palestinian Authority to require the Knesset's approval as a
precondition for the agreement to be internationally binding would
have required Israel to explicitly declare this to the other party, and
perhaps also to the UN institutions, during the negotiations stage in
order to satisfy its duty of good faith in conducting negotiations. A
declaration before the High Court of Justice that the government of
Israel will make the validity of the agreement contingent upon
Knesset's approval is not enough.2 30 Yet, the court in Weiss did not
require that the government notify the other party or the UN
institutions of the need for the Knesset's consent as a precondition for
the agreement's international validity.
The court also did not make the validity of a signed agreement
conditional upon the approval of the incoming newly elected Knesset
and government. Therefore, one could imagine an agreement that
was signed by a caretaker government, with its narrow mandate, and
was further ratified by an outgoing Knesset, which also had a narrow
mandate.231
Moreover, even when the Attorney General in Weiss attempted
to stipulate in the agreement, if reached, that "the agreement's
validity depended upon approvals prescribed by ifiternal law," it
would have been for naught, since internal law does not require the
Knesset's approval to give effect to an international agreement in the
232
international realm.
In fact, it is not even clear that an agreement needs to be
approved by the Knesset for it to become effective under internal law.
The court in Weiss declined to opine on whether constitutional custom

228.
229.

See Kamiar 22(2) PD at 96, 103-05.
See Gilad Noam, Treaty Making in Israel: The Applicable Law, in THE

AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO TREATIES IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

AND REFORM SUGGESTION 31, 31-47 (Moshe Hirsh ed., 2009), available at
law.huji.ac.illuploadTreaties.doc.
230.
On the importance of informing the other parties, see, for example, Kamiar
22(2) PD at 126-29; Bradley, supra note 198, at 334-35 (discussing the impact of the
United States' unsigning of the International Criminal Court treaty); Noam, supranote
229, at 38.
231.
On the legitimacy difference between an incoming and an outgoing
legislature, see infra Part V.B.2. See also supra note 119 and accompanying text.
232.
See supra text accompanying notes 225-27 (discussing the relationship
between the Knesset and the government regarding international treaties).
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requires that peace treaties involving territorial changes be ratified
by the Knesset. 23 3 Existing legislation does require the Knesset's
approval for territorial changes, but only with regard to territories
governed by the law, jurisdiction, and administration of the state (i.e.,
not including Judea and Samaria, or as commonly termed, the West
Bank).2 34 In this spirit, the court in the Livnat case did not interpret
Weiss as contemplating the additional step of ratification by the
Knesset. 235 At the same time, as far as constitutional rights of
citizens may be compromised as a result of the peace treaty, this
constitutional infringement would have to be authorized by statute.
In summary, it is doubtful whether making the validity of a
peace treaty conditional upon the Knesset's approval can remedy the
basic flaw of a caretaker government, without the Knesset's
confidence, engaging in peace talks. The very acts of negotiating and
signing the agreement have weighty implications. For example, they
affect: (1) Israel's reputation and its ability to engage in future
negotiations; (2) whether international sanctions will be imposed if

233.
See HCJ 5167/00 Weiss v. Prime Minister of Isr. 55(2) PD 455, 468 [2001]
(Isr.) (stating that evidence was insufficient to establish the existence of a
constitutional custom). For an opinion that such custom does exist, see generally
Shimon Shetreet, The Role of The Knesset in Treaty Making, 36 HAPRAKLIT 349 (1986).
234.
See The Law and Administration (Relinquishment of the Applicability of
Law, Jurisdiction and Administration) Act, 5759-1999, SH No. 1703 p. 86, § 2 (Isr.),
which states: "Any decision by the government according to which the Law,
Jurisdiction and Administration of the State of Israel shall no longer apply to a
territory requires the approval of the Knesset attained by a majority of its members."
Thus, such a decision must be backed by a sixty-one-vote majority. This law only
applies to the areas to which Israel extends its jurisdiction and legal system, and
therefore does not apply to the territories of Judea and Samaria that were never
formally annexed to Israel. See HCJ 1661/05 Reg'i Municipality of Gaza Beach v.
Knesset 59(2) PD 481 [2005] (Isr.). Recently, the Knesset enacted The Law and
Administration (Relinquishment of the Applicability of Law, Jurisdiction and
Administration) (Amendment) Act, 5771-2010, SH No. 2263 p. 58 (Isr.), in which it
requires that a referendum be held before the elected bodies decide to relinquish
territory that is annexed to Israel. If at least eighty Knesset members support the
relinquishment of territory, then the requirement to hold a referendum may be
ignored. In December 2010, Dr. Mohammed S. Wattad filed a petition with the Israeli
Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the referendum process on the
grounds that, inter alia, the process undermines the constitutional authority of the
elected bodies, as provided for in the Basic Laws. As such, the referendum process
should have been introduced in a Basic Law rather than in a regular statute. The
content of the petition (No. 9149/10) is available at http://humanrights.org.il/
main.asp?search= Ln.
For a different opinion, see Weill, supra note 62, at 382-84
(stating that "[tihe claimant's arguments are contrary to the concept of popular
sovereignty, which would demand that the People be allowed to express their opinion
on fundamental constitutional issues"). It should also be noted that, the Basic Law:
Jerusalem, Capital of Israel requires a majority of sixty-one votes in the Knesset to
approve the transfer of any sovereign power in Jerusalem. Basic Law: Jerusalem,
Capital of Israel, 5740-1980, SH No. 980 p. 186, §§ 6-7 (Isr.). It will also require
amending the Basic Law. Id. § 7.
235.
See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the Livnat decision).
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the agreement is not ratified; (3) whether the Knesset must vote on
the agreement en bloc, without being able to address its content; (4)
the duty of good faith in conducting bilateral negotiations; and (5) any
interim obligations that apply by international law upon signing the
agreement.
B. The Mandate Issue
It follows from the judicial decisions that the court was, in fact,
more stringent in protecting the people's ability to exercise its will
over public-sector appointments than it was with regard to peace
talks. This Article now examines the importance of the mandate in
each of these categories and whether it justifies distinguishing
between peace negotiations and public-sector appointments.
1.

Peace Negotiations

The Israeli Supreme Court defined Israeli democracy as one
requiring, inter alia, that "decisions fundamental to citizens' lives
must be adopted by the legislative body which the people elected to
make these decisions. Society's policies must be adopted by the
legislative body .... ,,23 6 The court emphasized that "[t]he desire to
preserve the elevated status of the Knesset is of general
238
application" 237 and is not confined to the nondelegation doctrine.
This approach has even greater applicability in decisions
involving territorial changes. Relinquishing governmental authority
and territorial changes are considered constitutive acts that require
special approval from the People. 2 39 In Israel, in contrast, referenda

236.
HCJ 3267/97 Rubinstein v. Minister of Def. 52(5) PD 481, 508 [1998] (Isr.).
237.
Id. at 511.
238.
The Israeli Supreme Court developed the nondelegation doctrine, under
which certain decisions must be made by the Israeli legislature rather than by the
executive branch. The court utilized this doctrine to strike down certain regulations
and government decisions, explaining that they are too important to be made by the
executive branch and must be decided instead by the Knesset. See, e.g., id. at 490-531
(applying the doctrine to actions concerning deferrals and exemptions from military
service). So far, the court did not use the nondelegation doctrine to strike down a
statute as granting too broad a discretion to the executive branch, though this may
happen in the future. See Rivka Weill, Did the Lawmaker Use a Canon To Shoot a
Flea? On Proportionalityin Law, LAW & BUS. J. (forthcoming).
239.
People with a capital P is used in instances in which the People are
involved in a dualist constitutional moment. I follow Ackerman's terminology in this
regard. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 3-33 (1991) (utilizing

the term People with a capital P to describe those involved in a constitutional moment).
Regarding the need to involve the People in territorial and sovereignty changes, see
A.V. DICEY, ENGLAND'S CASE AGAINST HOME RULE 71-100 (1886) (discussing the need
to obtain the People's consent as a precondition for Home Rule for Ireland). For a
similar argument, see also A.V. DICEY, A LEAP IN THE DARK OR OUR NEW CONSTITUTION
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or direct appeal to the People have until now not been de facto
exercised. 240 Furthermore, most of the territory that is the subject of
negotiations with the Palestinians has never been annexed to the
territory of the State of Israel, nor is it governed by the law,
jurisdiction, and administration of the state.2 41 It is treated under
Israeli law as territory under "belligerent occupation" and not under
the sovereignty of the state.2 4 2 Thus, relinquishing control over these
territories does not require the People's consent in a referendum
243
under Israeli law.
At the same time, since citizens of Israel have settled in parts of
the territory with the government's cooperation (or with its turning a
blind eye), it is necessary that the Knesset be a full partner in
processes that could prejudice the constitutional rights of citizens and
inhabitants. 244 This makes it problematic to empower a caretaker
government to conduct such significant negotiations when it does not
enjoy the Knesset's confidence. This is all the more applicable when
the government adopts measures that the Weiss court acknowledged
would spark fierce public debate, are a pivotal topic in elections, have
led to the fall of the government, and about which the Knesset has
24 5
already expressed its opinion against them.

113-16 (1893); JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 362 (Peter Laslett ed.,
1988) ("The People alone can appoint the Form of the Commonwealth ...").
240.
See REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD: THE GROWING USE OF DIRECT
DEMOCRACY 4 (David Butler & Austin Ranney eds., 1994) (noting that referenda have
not been utilized in Israel); see also supra note 234 (discussing recent legislation
requiring that a referendum be held before elected bodies make binding decisions to
relinquish territory annexed to Israel).
241.
Israel officially applied Israeli law, jurisdiction, and administration to the
Golan Heights. Golan Heights Law, 5742-1981, SH No. 1034 p. 6, § 1 (Isr.). East
Jerusalem is officially part of Israeli territory, and Israeli law, jurisdiction, and
administration applies with regard to it. In fact, this is part of Israel's constitutional
law. See Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, 5740-1980, SH No. 980 p. 186, § 5
(Isr.) ("The jurisdiction of Jerusalem includes, as pertaining to this basic law, among
others, all of the area that is described in the appendix of the proclamation expanding
the borders of municipal Jerusalem beginning the 20th of Sivan 5727"). Israel enacted
no similar laws with regard to Judea and Samaria (the West Bank).
242.
See HCJ 1661/05 Reg'l Municipality of Gaza Beach v. Knesset 59(2) PD
481, 514-16 [2005] (Isr.).
243.
See The Law and Administration (Relinquishment of the Applicability of
Law, Jurisdiction and Administration) Act, 5759-1999, SH No. 1703 p. 86, § 2 (Isr.)
(discussing when a referendum is required).
244.
See, e.g., HCJ 1661/05 Reg'l Municipality of Gaza Beach v. Knesset 59(2)
PD 481 [2005] (Isr.). The Court in Gaza Beach decided that the coerced evacuation of
Israeli citizens from Gaza was an infringement of their constitutional rights to
property and dignity. Such infringement was however justified if compensation
provisions were adequately provided for. The court found that the compensation
granted was unconstitutional. It thus intervened and enlarged the compensation
granted to those required to evacuate. Id.
245.
See, e.g., supra Part III.A (discussing the Weiss decision).
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In addition to territorial changes, the conduct of foreign affairs in
general is a subject that requires the executive to enjoy a mandate
from the people. Thus, for example, Walter Bagehot wrote that in the
parliamentary system a vote of no confidence is meant to force the
replacement of a prime minister, especially when people are not
happy with his or her decisions concerning foreign affairs. 246 Lori
Damrosch suggested that the impeachment process could be similarly
used against a president who prevents Congress from effectively
overseeing the conduct of foreign affairs, thus materially breaching
24 7
separation of powers principles.
Does this requirement of restraint in foreign affairs during
caretaker administrations serve right-wing ideology in Israel? This
Article suggests that the answer is no. The duty of caretaker
governments to exercise restraint is politically neutral, serving
neither right- nor left-biased ideology. It prevents not only peace
negotiations by caretaker administrations, but also midnight actions
of the right. For example, a petition was filed against a preelection
decision of Prime Minister Netanyahu in 1999 to close the Orient
House in East Jerusalem. 2 48 It was argued that the decision was an
attempt to indirectly influence the election's results. Moreover, it
could have led to bloodshed in the city.2 49 In response, the court
issued a one-week injunction barring the closure of the Orient House,
in effect granting the petitioners the final relief they sought, when
250
elections were held that same week.
One may also wonder whether the mirror image of conducting
negotiations toward a peace agreement is waging war. The court in
Weiss did indeed infer the government's authority to conduct peace
negotiations from its authority to go to war. 251 Recently, Prime

246.

See WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 58-59 (2d ed. 1963)

(discussing the great advantage of the parliamentary system over a presidential one as
manifested in parliament's authority to oust the government if the government lost
parliamentary support).
See Lori Fisler Damrosch, Impeachment as a Technique of Parliamentary
247.
Control over ForeignAffairs in a PresidentialSystem?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1525 (1999)
(offering that impeachment of the President may be used as the equivalent mechanism
to a no-confidence vote in a parliamentary system when the President acts against
congressional will in foreign affairs matters).
See HCJ 3123/99 Hillman v. Minister of Int'l Sec. (Nov. 5, 1999), Nevo
248.
Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
See Maoz, supra note 33, at 93.
249.
250.
See Hillman, HCJ 3121/99. Maoz criticizes the court for reaching opposite
results in the case of the Orient House (de facto acceptance of the political left-leaning
petition) versus the case of negotiations towards a peace agreement (rejection of a
petition from the political right). See Maoz, supra note 33, at 118.
251.

The government is the executive branch of the State (section 1 of the
Basic Law: the Government). Based on this power and additional powers
given to it (see, for example, sections 40 and 41 of the Basic Law: the
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Minister Olmert's caretaker government initiated a military
campaign in Gaza known as Operation Cast Lead, which was the
subject of the now-refuted Goldstone Report. 252 It could be argued
that the timing of this campaign enjoyed indirect legitimacy by the
Weiss decision.
Furthermore, even if these military operations were unavoidable,
it was among the caretaker government's crucial tasks to seriously
consider the propriety of carrying out the campaign as a caretaker.
The lack of public debate about the authority of Prime Minister
Olmert's caretaker government to undertake Operation Cast Lead,
along with bold statements of Prime Minister Begin about seizing the
caretaker period to bomb the nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981,253
suggest that considerations inhibiting actions by caretaker
governments are not part of the current political culture. It should be
noted, however, that in the end, Operation Cast Lead had the consent
of the opposition and was therefore not controversial. 254 This
mitigates the difficulty of conducting this action during a caretaker
period.
To conclude, the principle of restraint in the actions of caretaker
governments in foreign affairs should be applicable to both peace
negotiations and the conduct of military operations. The principle is
thus politically neutral and does not a priori benefit either side of the
political spectrum.
How then can the Weiss ruling be explained in the context of the
mandate? A distinction can be drawn between the Weiss ruling and
the Livnat ruling, although both deal with conducting international
peace negotiations during a caretaker term. The Weiss ruling
involved a caretaker government headed by a prime minister elected
through direct elections. 255 During that era, the Israeli system of
government was a fusion of a quasi-parliamentary and a quasipresidential system. 256 Therefore, the Prime Minister enjoyed a
separate mandate from the electorate--one that competed with the
mandate that the Knesset received in elections. Hence, even though
the government lost its parliamentary majority and arguably even

Government) it is empowered to administer the foreign and defense
policies of the State.
HCJ 5167/00 Weiss v. Prime Minister of the State of Isr. 55(2) PD 455, 471 [2001].
252.
See generally Goldstone Report, supra note 22 and accompanying text.
253.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
254.
See Ronen Leivoviwz & Raviv Druker, The Right Wing Parties Oppose the
Cease-Fire: The Rockets Will Reach Tel Aviv, NANA10 (Jan. 17, 2009),
news.nana10.co.ilArticle/?ArticleID=610288.
255.
See supra note 65 and accompanying text (explaining that Israel has a
parliamentary system with the exception of the years 1996-2003, in which direct
elections of the Prime Minister were held).
256.
See RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 33, at 822-23.
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the confidence of the Knesset, one may contend that the Prime
Minister still enjoyed a separate direct mandate from the electorate
during the preelection period that had not yet been repudiated. This
direct mandate enabled the administration to continue to conduct
negotiations with the Palestinians, notwithstanding its caretaker
status. Similarly, in the United States, it is customary for the
outgoing president to have full presidential power until elections
because U.S. presidents are elected by the people and enjoy an
independent direct mandate. 25 7 From this standpoint, the Weiss
ruling could have been justified, although the justices in Weiss did not
offer this justification.
The Livnat ruling, on the other hand, was delivered in December
2008, after direct elections of the Prime Minister were repealed and a
purely parliamentary system was restored. Under this system, once
the government loses the confidence of the Knesset, it does not have a
separate direct mandate from the electorate. It would therefore be
improper to conduct negotiations, especially those having fateful
consequences on the nation's future. Yet, the court in Livnat did not
note this distinction and did not arrive at an outcome different from
Weiss, even though this key difference logically leads to divergent
holdings.
2.

Public-Sector Appointments

The court took a much stricter stand on the issue of public-sector
appointments. It entirely banned them, even when the government
(regardless of its caretaker status) was prohibited from intervening in
the appointment, and thus there should have been no reason to
prohibit the appointment during the caretaker period. 258 This Article
asserts that the legitimacy of public-sector appointments made
during caretaker tenure should depend on the degree of governmental
influence on the appointment. When the government does not control
a majority of the appointing body, the legislature seems to have
expressed the view that the appointment is apolitical. In such cases,
it is doubtful whether the appointment should be put on hold during
the term of a caretaker administration.
For example, the date on which a chief rabbi can be appointed is
dictated by statutory provisions and not subject to the arbitrary wish

257.
However, the democratic legitimacy of the President weakens after election
and especially if the President's political party is defeated. See, e.g., Ivo H. Daalder &
James M. Lindsay, Lame-Duck Diplomacy, 24 WASH. Q. 15, 23 (2001) (discussing the
coordination between the Bush and Clinton Administrations during the transition of
power).
258.
See supra Part III.B (discussing prohibitions on public-sector appointments
during caretaker periods).
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of an outgoing government. 259 Moreover, the Knesset and the
government do not hold a majority on the committee that makes the
appointments, which is done by secret ballot. 26 0 In contradiction to
the court's stance, it is thus doubtful whether caretaker status should
prevent the appointment of chief rabbis. Yet, it is not enough to rely
only on the statutory language. If the government and the Knesset
have de facto decisive influence on the appointment despite the legal
appearance of lacking it, it should be deferred during caretaker
261
periods.
As for the restriction on judicial appointments by caretakers, a
similar argument was raised in the United States during the first
term of President Bush. Bruce Ackerman argued that, since the
presidential race remained undecided and the Supreme Court halted
the Florida recount, Bush did not have a mandate to appoint justices
2 62
to the U.S. Supreme Court.
When the system of appointment is political, as it is in the
United States, it is problematic to appoint justices during a caretaker
or lame-duck government. As discussed, the renowned Marbury v.
Madison263 case was sparked by the infamous decision of incoming
Thomas Jefferson to revoke last-minute appointments made by his
26 4
predecessor, John Adams, during the lame-duck presidency.
Adams made those rash last-minute appointments to gain control of
265
positions of power beyond the period of his mandate.
In Israel, whether judges can be appointed during the term of a
caretaker government must be inferred, among other things, from
one's perspective on the judicial-appointment system. 266 If it is
believed that the appointment system is based on professional merit
alone, as has been asserted by the Zamir public committee that dealt

259,
See Chief Rabbinate of Israel Law, 5740-1980, SH No. 965 p. 90, § 16 (Isr.).
260.
See id. §§ 4, 7, 8.
261.
For an analysis of the gap between the letter of the law and common
practice regarding political influence on such appointments, see, for example, HCJ
6673/01 Movement for Quality Gov't in Isr. v. Minister of Transp. 56(1) PD 799, 815
[2001] (Isr.).
262.
See Bruce Ackerman, The Court Packs Itself, AM. PROSPECT, Feb. 12, 2001,
at 48 ("To allow this president to serve as the Court's agent is a fundamental violation
of the separation of powers.").
263.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
264.
See supra Part III.B.4 ("President Thomas Jefferson, who followed Adams,
treated these last minute appointments as illegitimate and attempted to undo them
through various drastic measures.").
265.
See supra Part III.B.4 ("Adams intended to pack the judiciary with judges
who were affiliated with or identified with the Federalists in the face of the alreadyknown Republican electoral takeover of both the presidency and Congress.").
266.
For the composition of the Judicial Appointment Committee, see supra note
132 and accompanying text.
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26 7
with the subject, then there is no need to delay the appointment.
On the other hand, if the appointment committee is de facto
significantly driven and swayed by politicians, making its activities
politically motivated, then the appointment should be postponed until
after elections.
To conclude, from a democratic point of view, it seems that the
far-reaching implications of peace treaties on citizens' lives and on
national security far outweigh the importance of appointing chief
rabbis and even Israeli Supreme Court justices. Where peace treaties
are concerned, more so than with public-sector appointments, it is
vital that government actions represent the opinion of the people.
Moreover, when the Knesset and the government do not have decisive
influence on the appointment, the justification of delaying the
appointment is questionable, even during the term of a caretaker
administration. It may cause unnecessary paralysis in state affairs.

C. The JusticiabilityIssue
It may be argued that justiciability offers another possible
explanation for the judicial decisions that distinguish between peace
talks and public-sector appointments. According to this explanation,
the Israeli Supreme Court declines to intervene in peace negotiations
because it views the issue as one in which the executive branch has a
very broad scope of discretion. 268 It is therefore hard for the court to
find a decision that falls outside this scope and is considered
unreasonable. Consistent with the general Israeli judicial policy of
treating virtually every subject as justiciable, 269 the court does not
refer to peace negotiations as nonjusticiable. Yet, the results of its
decisions show maximum self-restraint from intervening in issues
related to national security and foreign affairs. Academics in the
legal-realism camp will explain that there is greater political
sensitivity and inherent danger in the court's intervention in peace
negotiations than in public-sector appointments and that this
270
explains the court's divergent treatment of the two.

267.
(2001).

See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT PROCEDURE COMMITTEE 25

268.
See HCJ 10357/08, Legal Forum for the Land of Isr. v. Gov't of Isr., at 3
(Dec. 9, 2008), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
See HCJ 1635/90 Zharzhevski v. Prime Minister, 45 PD 749, 775 [1991]
269.
(Isr.); HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. Minister of Def., 42(2) PD 441, 474 [1988] (Isr.)
("Adjudication is characterized by determination between claims, whatever content.").
One must, however, be mindful of evasive tactics that the court employs in order to
avoid making decisions in particularly difficult cases. See, e.g., Daphne Barak-Erez,
The Justiciability Revolution: An Evaluation, 50 HAPRAKLIT 3, 3-27 (2008); Yoav
Dotan, JudicialActivism in the HCJ,in JUDICIAL ACTIVIsM: FOR AND AGAINST 65-68
(Gavison et al. eds., 1990).
See Barak-Erez, supranote 269, at 10.
270.
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In other parliamentary systems, it is indeed customary to treat
the powers of a caretaker government as being nonjusticiable or
falling within the realm of constitutional conventions that are not
enforced by the courts. 2 71 But this attitude applies in these systems to
all realms of caretaker activity. Given Israel's broad approach to
justiciability, it is unlikely that peace negotiations by a caretaker
would or should be singled out as nonjusticiable. Indeed, the
assumption would be that, if the court does not intervene, it means
the conduct is proper.2 72 Moreover, the majority in Weiss did not
reject the petition as nonjusticiable, but rather ruled that conducting
'27 3
peace talks twelve days before elections was "reasonable.
Are there meaningful comparisons to peace negotiations in other
areas of state activity? In petitions involving security matters that
raise human rights infringements, the Israeli Supreme Court does
not refrain from intervening only because national security is at
stake. Rather, it examines whether the infringement of human rights
is constitutional. The court, for example, intervened on issues
concerning the mode of conducting war, including the issue of
2 74
targeted killings and the use of human shields.
This Article argues that the court should perform a similar
supervisory function with regard to caretaker governments' discretion
to conduct peace negotiations. The court in Weiss and Livnat was not
called upon to express its opinion on the content of the negotiations,
but on their timing. Judicial supervision of caretaker activity is
needed not only to demarcate the constitutional powers enjoyed by
the different branches of government, but also to preserve the heart
of the democratic process-the right of the people as a collective to
determine its arrangements on peace and security matters and the
individual right of each member of the political society to vote and
decide on such matters. 27 5 These rights are infringed when a

271.
See Beermann & Marshall, supra note 8, at 1270 ("There are no cases
addressing presidential duties and obligations with respect to transition, and even if a
legal dispute developed, it is likely that a court would find it nonjusticiable."); Davis et
al., supra note 4, at 11, 12 (indicating that Australian caretaker governments are
regulated by conventions, which are not enforceable by the courts).
272.
Cf. Thayer, supra note 104, at 155-56 (warning against expansion of
judicial oversight of government as it may shift responsibility to the courts instead of
the elected branches).
273.
See supra Part III.A.
274.
See HCJ 769/02 Public Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Isr., 57 (6)
PD 285,
51-54 [2006] (Isr.) (targeted killings); see also HCJ 3799/02 Adalah v. Cent.
Commander of IDF, 60(3) PD 67, It 5-7, 25 [20051 (Isr.) (human shields).
275.
In other cases, the court stated that it perceives the preservation of the
democratic character of the state as its core function and a principle so important that
even a "Basic Law" will be powerless to abolish democracy or materially change it.See,
for example, HCJ 6427/02 Movement for Quality Gov't v. Knesset, T 74 (Barak,
President), t 28 (Cheshin, Deputy President) (May 11, 2006), Nevo Legal Database (by
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caretaker, rather than a regular, government decides war and peace
issues. Furthermore, judicial review in this sphere of activity
strengthens democracy, in John Hart Ely's terms, rather than being
276
counter-majoritarian.
Judicial supervision of caretaker activity in foreign affairs
matters will align with recent calls made by experts on international
law that courts exercise judicial review over the conduct of foreign
affairs in general, and the transfer of sovereign powers in
particular. 2 77 These experts suggest that there is real concern that
the executive will increase its power at the expense of the legislature
by regulating matters through international agreements, which
previously were regulated by domestic legislation. 278 If the executive
takes action in these areas without approval from the legislature, this
'2 79
could create a severe "democratic deficit.
It should also be emphasized that, in the Israeli context, the
Knesset has no effective means of supervising the exercise of
authority by a caretaker government. It cannot "fire" a government
that is already a caretaker.280 Even a reprimand by the Knesset does
28 1
not obligate the government to follow the Knesset's mandates.
Furthermore, particularly when international negotiations are
involved, the supervisory power of the Knesset is limited. Without
active and volitional reporting by the government to the Knesset, the
latter cannot know what precisely is going on in the negotiations
room. It is therefore vital that a government conducting negotiations,
at minimum, be one that enjoys the confidence of the Knesset, not a
caretaker government.
This Article concludes that the various arguments which can be
used to explain the judicial policy of not intervening when caretakers
conduct
peace
negotiations
as
opposed
to
public-sector

subscription) (Isr.) (regarding the application of Israeli compulsory military service
laws to Yeshiva students).
276.
See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980)
(advancing a theory that justifies judicial review only when it serves to enhance the
democratic process, such as promotion of equality, free speech, the supervision of the
election process, and protection of minorities rights).
277.
See, e.g., Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV.
941 (2004) (discussing the institutional characteristics of the judicial branch and how
they should affect the judicial role in supervising issues of foreign affairs).
278.
See, e.g., Tomer Broude, Enteringinto Treatises in the State of Israel-From
Theory to Practice, in TREATY MAKING AUTHORITY IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL: CRITICAL
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 48-77 (2009); Barak Medina & Yuval Shani,
Division of Authority in the Process of Entering into an International Treaty by the
State: Basic Principles, in THE AUTHORITY To ENTER INTO TREATIES IN THE STATE OF
ISRAEL, 5-30 (Moshe Hirsh ed., 2009), available at law.huji.ac.il/uploadlTreaties.doc.
279.
See sources cited supranote 278.
280.
See supra Part II.B.
281.
RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 33, at 747. For a different opinion, see
Yoram Danziger, Strengthening the Status of the Knesset Decisions-How?, 34
HAPRAKLIT 212 pt. I, 413 pt. 11 (1982).
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appointments-(1) the reversibility of the decision, (2) the importance
of representing the electorate opinion on the subject, and (3) the issue
of justiciability, including whether there are alternative mechanisms
of review-all demonstrate that the court's intervention is actually
warranted, particularly when peace negotiations are concerned.
Furthermore, judicial intervention is even more warranted in peace
negotiations than in public-sector appointments. The lack of
uniformity in the judicial results is tantamount to inconsistency. It
may also contribute to the creation of a political culture that gives
caretaker governments carte blanche to make long-term historical
decisions that are the subject of fierce public controversy.
Those who are not willing to see the court intervene so boldly in
international affairs can at least agree that the court must declare
the issue explicitly nonjusticiable, a route the court has refused to
take. By declaring the issue nonjusticiable, the court at the very
minimum would have refrained from casting legitimacy to caretaker
action. This in turn would have left the government exposed to public
28 2
criticism.
In the next Part, this Article suggests that the Israeli
jurisprudence on caretaker action should not lead to the conclusion
that judicial review of caretaker action is unfeasible or not desired.
Rather, properly designing the law that applies to caretaker action
may lead to better judicial results, while also achieving the sanguine
goals of enhancing democracy and diminishing extraneous decisions
by caretaker governments.

V. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE DESIRED LAW

The conflicting results in Israeli Supreme Court jurisprudence
should not lead to the conclusion that caretaker activity cannot be
regulated. Rather, the experience of other parliamentary systems
with caretaker conventions suggests that proper guidelines may
contribute to a healthier functioning democracy, if these conventions
are obeyed. If they are not or those conventions do not develop, then
this Article argues that the judicial system should step in and enforce
283
restraint on caretaker activity.

282.
Interestingly, there are those who argue that the courts should supervise a
decision of the government to hold a no-confidence vote and hold early elections. See
Raymond Youngs & Nicklaus Thomas-Symonds, The Problem of the 'Lame Duck'
Government: A Critique of the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act, PARLIAMENTARY AFF.
(2012).
283.
See JOHARI, supra note 1, at 140. In fact, already in 1975, an unofficial
committee on electoral reforms in India proposed that "[a] convention backed by legal
sanction should be developed" that restricts the actions of caretaker governments. Id.
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Interestingly, in India, the President fulfills a special
supervisory role during transitional periods and ascertains that
caretaker governments do not exceed their limited mandate.28 4 In
regular times, in contrast, the President must follow the advice of his
ministers because they enjoy the legislature's confidence and he holds
only a rather symbolic role, much like the Crown in Britain. 28 5 This
special guardian role of the President at times of caretaker politics
received the assent of the Calcutta High Court. 28 6 The Court stated:
There is no mention of any care-taker Government as such, in our
Constitution or in the constitutional law .... But an extraordinary
situation like the present, in my opinion, calls for a care-taker
Government and therefore, the respondent No. 1 [Prime Minister] and
his Council of Ministers can only carry on day-to-day administration in
office which are necessary for carrying on "for making alternative
arrangements". In effect the President, in my opinion is therefore, not
obliged to accept the advice that the respondent No. 1 and his Council
of Ministers tender to him except for day-to-day administration and the
Council of Ministers and the respondent No. 1 should not make any
decisions which are not necessary except for the purpose of carrying on
the administration until other arrangements are made. This in effect
means that any decision or policy decision or any matter which can
await disposal by the Council of Ministers responsible to the House of
People must not be tendered by the respondent number I and his
Council of Ministers. With this limitation the respondent No. 1 and the
Council of Ministers can only function. And in case whether such advice
is necessary to carry on the day-to-day administration till "other
arrangements are made" or beyond that, the President, in my opinion,
287
is free to judge.

The discussion should thus focus on the proper design of the law
applicable to caretaker activity. This Article rises to this challenge by
showing where the Israeli Supreme Court could have adopted a better
law and why such law would have reached better results.

284.
See id. at 142-45 (suggesting instructions the Indian presidential
communiqu6 that dissolves the Lok Sabha, or lower house of Parliament, should
provide to the caretaker government, including to avoid important policy decisions,
remain no more than three months, and hold free and fair elections); Saviprasad, supra
note 5, at 398-99, 401 (discussing the Indian Constitution and caretaker governments);
see also Shriniwas Gupta, The President and Caretaker Government-A Modus
Vivendi, 7 CENT. INDIA L.Q. 27, 37-38, 404-05 (1994) (arguing that there is a need to
amend the Indian Constitution to clarify that the President is free to reject the advice
of a caretaker government); Roy, supra note 5, at 94-102.
See JOHARI, supranote 1, at 142-45.
285.
286.
Madan Murari v. Charan Singh, (1980) A.I.R. 95 (Cal.) 95, 105-06 (1979)
(India), available at http://judis.nic.inlsupremecourt/chejudis.asp.
287.
Id. The court handed down the decision on December 11, 1979. It should be
noted that the Bulgarian Constitutional Court, too, played a role in this field. It issued
an interpretive decision in 1993 regarding the powers of caretaker governments. See
Hristo D. Dimitrov, The Bulgarian Constitutional Court and Its Interpretive
Jurisdiction,37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 459, 488-89 (1999) (exploring the value of ex
ante guidance from the Constitutional Court at times of political volatility with
reference to Decision 20/92, DV 1 (1993)).
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Furthermore, this law may fit various jurisdictions dealing with the
challenge of transitional governments. This law may be in the form of
constitutional conventions that may even be codified in cabinet
manuals. If constitutional conventions prove to not be strong enough
to restrain governments, then the courts should step in and enforce
these guidelines. Enforcing these conventions in courts will turn them
into binding law.
A. Regular-Course-of-Affairs Criteria
The Weiss court rejected the criterion of "regular course of
288
affairs" as a measurement for the legitimacy of caretaker activity.
This Article, however, proposes to employ it to explain instances
when transitional governments do not need to act with restraint. The
widespread approach among parliamentary legal systems is that
caretaker governments must only deal with regular affairs, which
aligns with their role as a "babysitter" until the newly elected
28 9
government takes office.
Contrary to the argument in the Berenson Committee Report
that this test is inapplicable, 290 it has far-reaching practical
implications in other areas of law, including corporate, tax, and
property, especially when defining powers. 2 91 In these varying fields,
the criterion of "regular course of affairs" evolved in judicial decisions
on a case-by-case basis, while applying an "I know it when I see it"
292
approach.
This test is also consistent with the concept of democracy as
expressed in judicial rulings in the nondelegation field that the
material decisions in the life of the nation must be made by the
elected legislature rather than the executive body. 293 Furthermore, it
is a criterion used in corporate and property law to deal with
situations where there is concern that an agent is abusing his or her

288.
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
289.
See Klein, supra note 4, at 282 (comparing Sweden and Austria, where
caretaker governments have a limited mandate, to Israel, where the caretaker
government has the same authority as an established government).
290.
See BERENSON REPORT, supra note 59, at 6.
291.
See Weill, supra note 2, at 1112 (asserting the value of the regular affairs
limitation on caretaker governments, which is widely accepted in commonwealth
countries).
292.
This statement was made famous in the definition of pornography in
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). See id. at 197 (Stewart J., concurring).
293.
See HCJ 3267/97 Rubinstein v. Minister of Def. 52(5) PD 481, 508 [1998]
(Isr.); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 317-19
(2000) (providing a brief history of the nondelegation doctrine).
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powers, contrary to the interests of the principal. 294 These are
situations that do go beyond "the regular course of affairs. '2 95 The
test thus addresses both the agency difficulty and the democraticdeficit characteristic of caretaker and lame-duck governments. As
such, it fits to regulate caretaker and lame-duck administration's
activity.
To understand which actions are not in the regular course of
affairs, this Article proposes the use of criteria set forth by courts in
the context of the nondelegation doctrine. 296 If the criteria help to
define the powers of a regular government in the context of the
nondelegation doctrine, a fortiori they will help to set criteria for the
operation of a transitional government. Of course, issues that a
regular government may be authorized to handle under the
nondelegation doctrine might nonetheless be outside the regular
course of affairs for a transitional government. In other words, the
criterion of the regular course of affairs must be more stringently
applied to transitional governments.
It follows that any action cannot be deemed to be in the regular
course of affairs for a transitional government if it fits any one of the
following "risk" categories: it has long-term effects on entire public
sectors or even society as a whole, it is the subject of fierce public
controversy, it infringes constitutional rights, it is irreversible or hard
to undo, or it is opposed by the legislature. Similar criteria for the
operation of a caretaker government, though perhaps not as detailed
in
and instructive, were applied in various countries, including
29 7
Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and the United Kingdom.
Clearly, peace talks and major international agreements have all
the characteristics of actions that are not in the regular course of
affairs: (1) they have long-term effects on entire public sectors, or
even society as a whole; (2) they are usually the subject of fierce
public controversy, especially on the eve of an election; (3) they affect
constitutional rights, especially if they entail the evacuation of
citizens; and (4) they involve irreversible consequences. They should

See Weill, supra note 2, at 1112 (applying legal scholars' concerns of the
294.
potential agency problems that can occur outside of the regular course of affairs to
lame-duck governments).
Id.
295.
12-18 (Aug. 19, 2009)
See HCJ 6061/08 Israel v. Dep't of Agric., at
296.
(Arbel, J.), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.); HCJ 11163/03 Arab Higher
38-40 (Feb. 27, 2006) (Cheshin,
Monitoring Comm. v. Prime Minister of Isr., at
Deputy President), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.); Weill, supra note 2, at
1113 (applying the animating principle behind the nondelegation doctrine-which
requires certain fundamental decisions to be made by the legislature rather than the
executive-to avoid the agency problems that could arise with a lame-duck
government).
See Boston et al., supra note 3, at 632 (describing caretaker conventions in
297.
parliamentary systems where the caretaker government retains its legal authority but
is expected to avoid "issues of significance").
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not be conducted in caretaker or lame-duck periods. In contrast, the
encompasses some public-sector
regular course of affairs
appointments, including some made on the eve of elections, especially
when the appointments are not controversial and when the
government has only minor weight in making the appointment. In
those cases, there is no reason to paralyze the country's regular
affairs. Thus, had the Israeli Supreme Court used the criteria for the
regular course of affairs suggested, it may have reached more
justified judicial decisions. The problem with the court's
jurisprudence is not that the topic should be treated as nonjusticiable,
but rather that the court did not apply the proper criteria to regulate
caretaker action.
B. PermittingExtraordinaryMeasures
This Article further proposes that a transitional government
should be empowered to take extraordinary measures-that is,
actions falling outside the regular course of business-when there is a
"vital public need for action" or when the incoming legislature has
preapproved such extraordinary measures.
1.

A Vital Public Need for Action

A vital public need for action occurs during emergencies, and the
transitional government should be empowered to respond as any
regular government, so long as there is a causal relation between its
actions and the state of emergency.
The government should also be empowered to act in cases that
fail short of an emergency. If, at the discretion of the government, it
is vital to take an extraordinary measure, it must confer with the
opposition and, if possible, adopt measures on which there is
consensus. For example, during New Zealand and Australia's severe
financial crises in the mid-1980s, the caretaker governments deferred
to the dictates of the incoming governments on how to manage the
crises when they depreciated the local currency. 298 Contrary to New
Zealand and Australia's experiences, however, this Article argues
that the incumbent government must confer with the opposition, but
need not accept its dictates. After all, the final accountability for the
action rests with the incumbent government. There is no recognizable
constitutional institution as the government-elect or president-elect
upon whom accountability may be bestowed.

See id. at 634-36 (describing how, after initial disagreement between the
298.
outgoing Prime Minister and incoming government, the incumbent implemented the
strategy advised by the new government for responding to the exchange-rate crisis).
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In such cases of vital public need for action, transitional
governments must also try to limit the long-term effects of their
actions. For instance, to prevent paralyzing the country, caretaker
governments in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom are permitted to make temporary appointments for a fixed
period of up to several months, temporarily extend appointments that
are about to expire, and extend contracts that are about to expire for
299
a limited period.
2.

Preapproval of the Legislature for Taking an Extraordinary
Measure

This Article further proposes that extraordinary actions should
be prohibited if they do not fall under the vital public interest
justification unless preapproved by the legislature. In contrast to
Claude Klein's proposal, made in the Israeli context, that a caretaker
government will be empowered to act unless instructed otherwise by
the Knesset,3 00 the default rule in this proposed framework prevents
transitional governments from undertaking extraordinary acts.
Assuming that the legislature will be asked to preapprove an
extraordinary measure of a transitional government, should a
distinction be made between pre- versus post-election actions taken
by the caretaker or lame duck? Before and just prior to elections,
legislative members themselves are usually running for office.
Therefore, it may not be appropriate for them to approve
extraordinary measures, since their current mandate is also about to
expire.3 0 1 Following elections, when a new legislature is established,
approval by the incoming legislature of an action of a caretaker or
lame-duck government has significance. Where, in a parliamentary

299.
See TIERNAN & MENZIES, supra note 51, at 54 (describing New Zealand's
approach to transitional arrangements, which recommends that caretaker
governments facing decisions that will bind the incoming government either defer such
decisions, create temporary solutions, or resolve them in consultation with other
parties); see also Davis et al., supra note 4, at 14 (describing the Commonwealth's
flexible approach to temporary public appointments during a caretaker period). See
generally sources cited supra note 51 (codifying constitutional conventions).
300.
See Klein, supra note 4, at 285-86 (suggesting that a caretaker government
be empowered to act as it wishes in the absence of specific instructions from the
Knesset and thereby avoid the problem of government paralysis).
301.
The Parliament Act of 1911 endorsed a perception of distinguishing
between a fresh and an old mandate from the people. The House of Commons' power to
pass statutes was at its peak when its mandate was fresh from the people and at its
lowest point toward the end of its life. This is so because only in the last two years of a
parliament's life the Lords' suspensory veto meant potentially de facto absolute veto.
Rivka Weill, Centennial to the Parliament Act 1911: The Manner and Form Fallacy,
PUB. L. 105, 117 (2012). See generally ACKERMAN, LAMEDUCK IMPEACHMENT, supra
note 8 (arguing in favor of restricting the authority of lame-duck Congresses to
impeach the President based on legitimacy concerns).
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system, the power of governments depends on confidence, approval of
caretaker action by the incoming legislature serves an analogous
purpose. It is also reasonable to assume that the incoming
parliament's approval is also a green light from the incoming
administration, which depends on parliamentary confidence and
controls a parliamentary majority. In conclusion, parliamentespecially an incoming one-has the authority to preapprove an
extraordinary measure of a caretaker government. Similarly, in a
presidential system, the nod from an incoming Congress lends
democratic legitimacy to the actions of the lame-duck executive, who
otherwise suffers from severe democratic deficit.
This proposed framework strikes a proper balance between the
need for governmental continuity and the need to prevent caretaker
or lame-duck governments from making fateful and irreversible
decisions when their mandate is limited and their actions might be
driven by extraneous considerations. This proposed framework may
be codified in constitutional conventions in countries that are
characterized by executive self-restraint. In other countries, this
framework may be developed in case law enforced by the courts. Of
course, restrictions on caretaker government may also be part of the
constitutional text as has happened in Denmark.3 0 2 But, the absence
of an explicit constitutional text should not be a barrier for imposing
such restrictions.
In addition, this Article suggests amending the legislation
regulating this field in parliamentary systems. In light of the findings
that prolonged caretaker periods occur in Israel precisely at times
when elections are moved up and during the preelection period, 30 3 a
change in election timetables must set the vote to occur within a fixed
and brief period of two months.3 0 4 This will significantly minimize
the duration, as well as the occurrence, of caretaker governments and

302.

Section 15(2) of the Constitutional Act of Denmark of June 5, 1953, states:

When the Folketing [Parliament] passes a vote of no confidence in the Prime
Minister, he shall ask for the dismissal of the Ministry unless writs are to be
issued for a general election. Where a vote of censure has been passed on a
Ministry, or it has asked for its dismissal, it shall continue in office until a new
Ministry has been appointed. Ministers who remain in office as aforesaid shall
perform only what may be necessary to ensure the uninterrupted conduct of
official business.
CONSTITUTIONAL ACT OF DENMARK OF JUNE 5, 1953, § 15(2), available at
http://www.eu-oplysningen.dk/upload/application/pdf/01 72b7l9/Constitution/%20of%/2O
Denmark.pdf.
303.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
304.
In fact, the Berenson Committee included such a recommendation in its
report. See BERENSON REPORT, supra note 59; see also JOHARI, supra note 1, at 144
(suggesting that caretaker periods be limited to two or three months at most in India,
despite the fact that India is the most populated democratic country in the world and
therefore requires a relatively long election period).
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their inherent constitutional difficulties. It is high time to protect the
most basic democratic values of representation, accountability, and
majority rule, which are imperiled by caretaker governments.

VI. CONCLUSION

Caretaker and lame-duck administrations pose unique
challenges to democracy because they are characterized by both
democratic deficit and agency difficulties. Parliamentary systems
that belonged to the Commonwealth or were influenced by British
law have dealt with this challenge quite successfully through
constitutional conventions that are observed by the political
branches. In contrast, the U.S. presidential system suffers from great
abuse of presidential lame-duck power. Similar abuse is evident in
Israeli caretaker administrations, despite Israel's parliamentary
system. Israel has dealt with the challenge differently than the
United States. In light of caretaker abuse, the Israeli Supreme Court
intervened to regulate caretaker activity, an atypical approach to this
matter. Studying the court's unique jurisprudence assists in
developing the proper law that should govern transitional
governments, as well as in assessing whether judicial review of
constitutional transitions is feasible or desirable.
Using Israel as a case study within a comparative constitutional
framework, three important lessons may be suggested. First, it is not
the nature of the constitutional system per se, whether parliamentary
or presidential, that determines the success of preventing abuses of a
transitional government's power. Rather, the potential for abuse
exists in both types of systems. Furthermore, the challenges posed by
these transitional governments are similar in both types of systems.
Second, transitional governments' power is not a topic that cannot
inherently be regulated by courts. Rather, if constitutional
conventions fail to do their job or do not develop, judicial review is a
potent possibility. Last, it is not enough to determine that
transitional governments must act with restraint, as the Israeli
Supreme Court has determined, but it is important to give concrete
meaning as to which actions are permitted by transitional
governments and under what circumstances they are allowed.

